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Abstract
We model social choices as acts mapping states of nature to (public) out-
comes. A social choice function (or SCF) assigns an act to every prole of
subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A SCF is strategyproof if no
agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of na-
ture or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post ecient if the act selected
at any given preference prole picks a Pareto-ecient outcome in every state of
nature. We oer a complete characterization of all strategyproof and ex-post
ecient SCFs. The chosen act must pick the most preferred outcome of some
(possibly dierent) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which
an agent's top outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief prole;
it is the union of all the states assigned to her by a collection of bilaterally
dictatorial and bilaterally consensual assignment rules.
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1 Introduction
We address the problem of designing incentive-compatible mechanisms for making
social choices under uncertainty. Following Savage (1954), we model such choices
as acts mapping states of nature to outcomes, and we assume that agents compare
acts according to the subjective expected utility they yield. Society chooses acts
on the basis of the preferences of its members: a social choice function asks agents
to report their preferences over acts, and assigns an act to every preference prole.
Outcomes are public in nature: they are of interest to all agents. Applications range
from a democratic government choosing social policies in an uncertain environment
to a manager making investment decisions on behalf of the shareholders of the rm.
Since individual preferences are (a priori) private information, it is important that a
social choice function be incentive-compatible. This paper focuses on the property of
strategyproofness, which requires that reporting one's true preferences be a dominant
strategy: no agent should ever have an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs or her
valuation of the outcomes. Because subjective expected utility preferences form a re-
stricted domain,1 the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite
(1975)) does not apply. This raises the problem of describing the set of strategyproof
social choice functions.
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied. The related
literature may be divided into three strands. The rst strand belongs to the eld
of statistics. It is concerned with the problem of eliciting an agent's assessment of
the likelihood of uncertain events. The best known incentive-compatible elicitation
procedures are Savage's (1971) proper scoring rules; see Gneiting and Raftery (2007)
for a survey of the literature on the topic. Other procedures include de Finetti's
(1974) promissory notes method and Karni's (2009) direct revelation mechanism.
These methods do not elicit the agent's valuation of the outcomes and do not ad-
dress the social choice problem of selecting an act based on the preferences of several
individuals.
The second and most closely related strand studies strategyproofness in the con-
text of risk, that is, when society chooses lotteries rather than acts. The seminal
contribution is due to Gibbard (1977), who analyzes social choice rules asking agents
to report their preferences over sure outcomes only. Hylland (1980), Dutta, Peters
and Sen (2007, 2008), and Nandeibam (2013) allow agents to report full-edged von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries. A central nding in this literature
is that every strategyproof and ex-post ecient social choice function is a random dic-
tatorship. Ex-post eciency requires that the chosen lottery attaches zero probability
to every Pareto-dominated sure outcome. A random dictatorship selects each agent's
most preferred outcome with a probability that does not depend on the reported
preference prole.
1With two states of nature and three outcomes, there are 362 880 linear preference orderings over
the 9 possible acts, of which only 96 are of the expected utility type.
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Finally, let us mention that the issue of preference aggregation under uncertainty
has received a good deal of attention: see Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Mongin
(1995), Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004), and Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler
(2014), among others. This literature, which is normative in nature, is not concerned
with the incentive-compatibility issue and is therefore only tangentially related to our
work. It shows that utilitarian aggregation of preferences is problematic; it also ques-
tions the desirability of Pareto eciency when individual beliefs dier, and proposes
weakened versions of it.
In line with the literature on strategyproofness under risk, we restrict attention to
social choice functions that are ex-post ecient. Under uncertainty, ex-post eciency
means that the act selected at a given preference prole should recommend a Pareto
ecient outcome in every state of nature. This does not imply that the chosen act is
Pareto ecient.
We oer a complete characterization of all strategyproof and ex-post ecient social
choice functions.
We begin by proving that every such function must be a top selection: at every
preference prole, the chosen act must pick in each state of nature the most preferred
outcome of some agent (possibly picking dierent agents in dierent states). A top
selection is fully characterized by its associated assignment rule determining in which
states of nature each agent dictates the outcome.
We then describe which assignment rules do generate strategyproof social choice
functions. Constant assignment rules are one obvious possibility; the social choice
functions they generate are analogous to the random dictatorships identied in the
literature on strategyproof choice of lotteries. But, in contrast to the ndings in
that literature, there exist here more exible rules. It turns out that if the agents'
valuations cannot be used in assigning states, their beliefs can. To some extent, the
mechanism designer can exploit the dierences in subjective probabilities to make sure
that each agent selects the outcome in states that she nds relatively more likely.
This can be done in two primitive ways, which turn out to constitute the build-
ing blocks of all ex-post ecient strategyproof social choice functions. A bilaterally
dictatorial assignment rule lets one agent, say 1; choose from an exogenous menu of
events (i.e., subsets of states) the one she considers most likely { leaving the com-
plement event to some other predetermined agent, say 2. The corresponding social
choice function then picks 1's top outcome in the event she declared most likely, and
2's top outcome otherwise. Under a bilaterally consensual assignment rule, the state
space is exogenously partitioned into two events. The rst is tentatively assigned to,
say, agent 1; and its complement is assigned to, say, 2: However, if agent 1 reports
that the second event is more likely than the rst and agent 2 reports the opposite
belief, they exchange events. The social choice function picks an agent's reported top
outcome in every state that the bilaterally consensual assignment rule has assigned
to her.
Under the basic rules described above, only two agents have a say in the nal
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decision. But such rules can be combined as follows (if the mechanism designer wants
all agents to aect the decision). Fix an exogenous partition of the state space into
events. For each event belonging to that partition, choose a (possibly dierent) pair
of agents. Use a bilaterally dictatorial or a bilaterally consensual \sub-rule" to assign
the states belonging to that event on the basis of these two agents' conditional beliefs
over these states. Compute the overall event assigned to an agent by taking the union
of the events assigned to her by all these assignment sub-rules. Our theorem asserts
that every strategyproof and ex-post ecient social choice function is a top selection
based on a such a union of bilaterally dictatorial or bilaterally consensual assignment
sub-rules.
Two remarks are in order. The rst is a point of (re)interpretation. Assignment
rules, which are mappings from proles of beliefs into partitions of the state space,
are mathematically equivalent to rules for allocating (valuable) indivisible objects to
agents having additively separable preferences over bundles of objects.2 It is easy
to see that the assignment rule associated with a strategyproof and ex-post ecient
social choice function must itself be strategyproof: by misrepresenting her beliefs,
an agent cannot obtain an event she considers more likely than the one she gets
by reporting truthfully. When there are only two agents, a social choice function is
strategyproof and ex-post ecient if and only if it is generated by a strategyproof
assignment rule. In that particular case, as a by-product, our theorem solves the
problem of characterizing all strategyproof assignment rules for allocating indivisible
objects between two agents with additively separable preferences: these rules are
precisely the constant, dictatorial, or consensual unions dened in Section 4. This
two-agent result was proved independently by Amanatadis et al. (2017), who do not
study at all the problem of choosing social outcomes under uncertainty, nor consider
n-agent assignment rules.
The second remark is technical. The set of acts is a Cartesian product, and sub-
jective expected utility preferences over acts are additively separable. It is known
that when individual preferences over a product set of social alternatives are separa-
ble and form a suitably rich domain, strategyproof social choice rules are products
of strategyproof \sub-rules" dened on the marginal proles of preferences over the
components of the social alternatives. Le Breton and Sen (1999) oer general the-
orems of this type; earlier papers proving variants of the result include Border and
Jordan (1983), Barbera, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991), and Barbera, Gul and Stac-
chetti (1993). This decomposition property does not hold in our setting. The reason
is that subjective expected utility preferences do not form a rich domain. Le Breton
and Sen's (1999) richness condition requires that for any collection of admissible pref-
erences over the components of the social alternatives there exists a preference over
the social alternatives which induces marginal preferences over components coinciding
2Reinterpret states of nature as objects and observe that beliefs dene additively separable \pref-
erences" over subsets of states. Papai (2007) studies various subclasses of n-agent strategyproof
allocation rules for arbitrary monotonic preferences.
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with the ones in that collection. Since in our setting all state-contingent preferences
over outcomes induced by a subjective expected utility preference over acts are iden-
tical, Le Breton and Sen's condition is violated. It is this lack of richness that makes
it possible to dene non-decomposable rules where beliefs aect the states where an
agent's top outcome is selected.
2 The problem
There is a nite set of agents N = f1; :::; ng with n  2; a nite set of states of
nature 
 with j
j  2; and a nite set of outcomes X with jXj  3: Outcomes
should be interpreted as public alternatives (such as policies or allocations) that are
of interest to all agents. Subsets of 
 are called events. An act is a function f 2 X
.
Agent i's preference ordering <i over acts is assumed to be of the subjective expected
utility type: there exist a valuation function vi : X ! R and a subjective probability
measure pi on the set of events such that for all f; g 2 X
,
f <i g ,
X
!2

pi(!)vi(f(!)) 
X
!2

pi(!)vi(g(!)):
Note that we write ! instead of f!g and i instead of fig; we will often omit curly
brackets to alleviate notation. Of course, since the set of acts is nite, neither the
valuation function vi nor the subjective probability measure pi representing the pref-
erence ordering <i are determined uniquely.
Throughout the paper, we assume that <i is a linear ordering. This is a rea-
sonable assumption given that the set of acts is nite. It implies that for any
(vi; pi) representing <i, (i) vi is injective and (ii) pi is injective: for all E;E 0  
;
pi(E) = pi(E
0) ) E = E 0: Because pi(;) = 0, it follows from (ii) that pi(!) > 0
for all ! 2 
: We further assume, without loss of generality, that vi is normalized:
minX vi = 0 < maxX vi = 1: We denote by V the set of normalized injective valuation
functions vi and by P the set of (necessarily positive) injective measures pi, which
we call beliefs. Formally, the domain of preferences is the set of pairs (vi; pi) that
generate a linear ordering of the set of acts, that is to say,
D =
(
(vi; pi) 2 V  P :
X
!2

pi(!)vi(f(!)) 6=
X
!2

pi(!)vi(g(!)); 8f; g 2 X
 s.t. f 6= g
)
:
A social choice function (or SCF ) is a function ' : DN ! X
: We denote the
ordered list ((v1; p1); :::; (vn; pn)) 2 DN by (v; p): In principle, our formulation allows
a SCF ' to choose dierent acts for proles (v; p) and (v0; p0) that represent the same
prole of preferences (<1; :::;<n). Of course, the requirement of strategyproofness
dened below will rule this out. With a slight abuse of terminology, we therefore call
any (v; p) 2 DN a preference prole. We call v = (v1; :::; vn) 2 VN a valuation prole
and p = (p1; :::; pn) 2 PN a belief prole. For every preference prole (v; p) 2 DN and
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every ! 2 
, we denote by '(v; p;!) the outcome chosen by the act '(v; p) in state
!.
We emphasize that the chosen act is allowed to change when an agent's valuation
function is replaced with another that generates the same ranking of the outcomes
but a dierent ordering of the acts: no information about individual preferences is a
priori discarded.
As usual, v i 2 VNni and p i 2 PNni denote the valuation and belief sub-proles
obtained by deleting vi from v and pi from p, respectively. A SCF ' is strategyproof
if, for all i 2 N; all (v; p) 2 DN ; and all (v0i; p0i) 2 D;X
!2

pi(!)vi('(v; p;!)) 
X
!2

pi(!)vi('((v
0
i; v i); (p
0
i; p i);!)):
This means that distorting one's preferences {by misrepresenting one's valuation func-
tion or one's beliefs{ is never protable.
A SCF ' is ex-post ecient if for all (v; p) 2 DN and all ! 2 
, there is no x 2 X
such that vi(x) > vi('(v; p;!)) for all i 2 N: In words, ex-post eciency says that
a social outcome that all agents value less than some other outcome x should never
be picked. This requirement does not imply that the acts chosen by ' are (ex-ante
Pareto) ecient at all preference proles.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the class of all strategyproof and ex-post
ecient SCFs.
3 A preliminary result: the Top Selection lemma
An assignment is an ordered listA = (A1; :::; An) of subsets of 
 such that Ai\Aj = ;
whenever i 6= j; and [i2NAi = 
:We refer to the condition that A1; :::; An partition 

as feasibility. Let S denote the set of assignments. An assignment rule is a function
s : PN ! S assigning to each belief prole p an assignment s(p) = (s1(p); :::; sn(p)).
We refer to si(p); the event assigned to agent i at p; as i's share. Note that an agent's
share may be empty.
For all vi 2 V ; let (vi) denote the unique maximizer (or top) of vi in X.
Top Selection Lemma. If a SCF ' is strategyproof and ex-post ecient, then there
exists a unique assignment rule s : PN ! S such that, for all (v; p) 2 DN , ! 2 
,
and i 2 N , we have
! 2 si(p)) '(v; p;!) = (vi): (1)
We say that the assignment rule s in (1) is associated with (or generates) '; and
we call ' a top selection.
The Top Selection lemma really contains two statements. The rst is that every
strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF can only choose acts that pick in every state of
nature some agent's top outcome. This forbids choosing acts that select \compromise
6
outcomes". As an illustration, suppose that N = f1; 2g ; X = fa; b; cg and consider
a preference prole (v; p) such that v1(a) = v2(c) = 1; v1(b) = v2(b) = :99; and
v1(c) = v2(a) = 0. The Top Selection lemma tells us that the natural compromise
outcome b cannot be picked in any state of nature at this prole. The only admissible
form of compromise (at a xed belief prole p) consists in allowing dierent agents
to choose the nal outcome in dierent states of nature. An obvious corollary is that
no strategyproof SCF is (ex-ante Pareto) ecient.
The second statement contained in the Top Selection lemma is that the set of states
in which an agent's top outcome is selected depends only upon the prole of beliefs:
the valuation prole v is not an argument of the function s. An immediate corollary
is that a strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF is tops-only :3 if (v; p); (v0; p) 2 DN
and (vi) = (v
0
i) for all i 2 N , then '(v; p) = '(v0; p). The chosen act depends only
upon the belief prole and the tops of the valuation functions.
The proof of the Top Selection lemma is in Appendix A but it may be worth
sketching the main lines of the argument here. We proceed by induction. We rst
show that every two-agent strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF must be a tops-
only top selection (Lemma 4). We then focus on the case n  3 and, making use
of the induction hypothesis, we show in Lemma 5 that a strategyproof and ex-post
ecient SCF must select top outcomes whenever two agents (or more) report the
same top. Finally, we show in Lemma 6 that under our two axioms (a) the chosen
act must select only top outcomes (for all preference proles and in every state);
(b) the tops-only property holds: the decision must remain the same if some agents
change their valuations of any non-top outcomes. It thus follows from these results
that, at each preference prole (v; p), every strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF
must partition the state space 
 by assigning some event si(v; p) to each agent i.
We conclude the proof by arguing that, in fact, each agent's share of the state space
does not vary with the valuation prole v. Three consequences of strategyproofness
(stated in Lemmas 1-3) are pervasive in the proof sketched above.
4 Statement of the theorem
The Top Selection lemma is not a characterization result yet. The SCF generated by
an assignment rule is ex-post ecient but need not be strategyproof. Our task is now
to determine which assignment rules do indeed generate a strategyproof SCF.
In order to state our main theorem, we need to extend some of our notation to
subsets of events. Fix ; 6= 
0  
: A belief on 
0 is an injective probability measure pi
dened on 2

0
and the set of beliefs on 
0 is denoted P(
0); note that P(
) = P . An
assignment of 
0 is an ordered list of non-intersecting subsets of 
0 that cover 
0 and
S(
0) denotes the set of assignments of 
0; note that S(
) = S: An 
0-assignment
3The cumbersome term \valuations tops-only" would be more precise: the SCFs identied in
the Top Selection lemma may certainly use more information than just the tops of the preference
orderings <1; :::;<n in the set of acts.
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rule is a function s : P(
0)N ! S(
0).
If pi 2 P , we denote by pi j 
0 the conditional belief generated by pi on P(
0),
namely, (pi j 
0)(A) = pi(A)=pi(
0) for all A  
0: If p 2 PN , we write p j 
0 = (p1 j

0; :::; pn j 
0):
Three types of assignment rules will be central in our analysis: the constant,
bilaterally dictatorial, and bilaterally consensual rules. An 
0-assignment rule s is
constant if there exists an assignment A of 
0 such that s(p) = A for all p 2 P(
0)N :
A proper covering of 
0 is a family A of subsets of 
0 such that AnB and BnA are
nonempty for all distinct A;B 2 A, [A2AA = 
0; and \A2AA = ;: For any belief pi
on 
0; we denote by argmax
A
pi the event maximizing pi in the family A. If i; j 2 N are
two distinct agents, a rule s is called (i; j)-dictatorial if there exists a proper covering
A of 
0 such that si(p) = argmax
A
pi and sj(p) = 

0 n argmax
A
pi for all p 2 P(
0)N :
Note that, by feasibility, sk(p) = ; for all k 6= i; j and all p: Note also that, because A
is a proper covering of 
0, an (i; j)-dictatorial rule s is not constant; moreover, there
is no ordered pair (i0; j0) 6= (i; j) for which s is (i0; j0)-dictatorial. We call s bilaterally
dictatorial if it is (i; j)-dictatorial for some (unique) ordered pair of agents (i; j):
Finally, we say that s is fi; jg-consensual if there exists a nonempty set A  
0
(where  denotes strict inclusion) such that
(si(p); sj(p)) =
(
(
0 n A;A) if pi(
0 n A) > pi(A) and pj(A) > pj(
0 n A);
(A;
0 n A) otherwise.
Again, feasibility implies sk(p) = ; for all k 6= i; j and all p: We call s bilaterally
consensual if it is fi; jg-consensual for some (unique) unordered pair of agents fi; jg :
Bilaterally dictatorial and bilaterally consensual rules exploit beliefs in dierent
ways. The former allow the mechanism designer to extract detailed information about
the beliefs of a single agent; their range may be large. The latter have a binary range
but allow the designer to exploit dierences in beliefs between agents.
An assignment rule s is a union of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally
consensual rules (or a C-BD-BC union), if there is a partition f
tgTt=1 of 
; and,
for each t = 1; :::; T; a constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual 
t-
assignment rule st such that
si(p) = [Tt=1sti(p j 
t)
for all p 2 PN and all i 2 N:Merging cells of the partition if necessary, we may assume
without loss of generality that there is at most one t for which st is constant and, for
each ordered pair of agents (i; j); at most one t for which st is (i; j)-dictatorial. This
is the canonical representation of a C-BD-BC union.
Theorem. A SCF ' is strategyproof and ex-post ecient if and only if it is a top
selection whose associated assignment rule s is a C-BD-BC union.
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Note that our assumption jXj  3 is needed for this result. When there are two
outcomes and an odd number of agents, majority voting between the two constant
acts denes a strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF.
Remark also that a dictatorial assignment rule |which allows a single agent to
select the assignment that maximizes the subjective probability of her own share
(over the range of the rule){ does not generate a strategyproof SCF if it is not the
union of bilaterally dictatorial sub-rules. As an example, suppose that N = f1; 2; 3g ;

 = f!1; !2; !3g ; X is arbitrary, and dene the assignment rule s : PN ! S by
s(p1; p2; p3) =
8<:
(f!1g ; f!2g ; f!3g) if argmax
 p1 = !1;
(f!2g ; f!3g ; f!1g) if argmax
 p1 = !2;
(f!3g ; f!1g ; f!2g) if argmax
 p1 = !3:
It is easy to see that s is not a union of bilaterally dictatorial sub-rules. To see why
the top selection SCF ' generated by s is not strategyproof, consider a preference
prole (v; p) such that p1(!1) = :52; p1(!2) = :12; p1(!3) = :36; v1((v2)) = 1;
and v1((v3)) = 0: If all agents report their preferences truthfully, the selected act
'(v; p) = ('(v; p;!1); '(v; p;!2); '(v; p;!3)) = ((v1); (v2); (v3)) yields to agent 1
an expected utility of :64: If agent 1 reports (v1; p
0
1) with argmax
 p
0
1 = !3; the selected
act '(v; (p01; p2; p3)) = ((v2); (v3); (v1)) yields an expected utility of :88; which is
higher. A similar example can be constructed to see the importance of bilaterality
for consensual assignment rules.
5 Proof of the theorem: local bilaterality
It is easy to check that every SCF generated by a C-BD-BC union is strategyproof and
ex-post ecient. In order to prove the converse statement, given the Top Selection
lemma, it suces to prove that the assignment rule s associated with a strategyproof
and ex-post ecient SCF ' is a C-BC-CD union. In the current section, we show that
s satises a strong incentive-compatibility property {dubbed super-strategyproofness{
and we use this property to characterize the local behavior of s: It turns out that this
behavior is bilateral: an elementary change in an agent's belief may only aect her
own share and that of one other agent.
Call an assignment rule s : PN ! S strategyproof if pi(si(p))  pi(si(p0i; p i)) for
all i 2 N; p 2 PN ; and p0i 2 P : no agent can increase the likelihood of the event
assigned to her by misrepresenting her belief.
For any assignment A = (A1; :::; An) 2 S and any M  N , write AM = [i2MAi:
Call s super-strategyproof if pi(sM(p))  pi(sM(p0i; p i)) for all i;M such that i 2
M  N; all p 2 PN ; and all p0i 2 P : by misrepresenting her belief, an agent can never
increase the likelihood of the event assigned to any group to which she belongs.
For any ! 2 
 and p 2 PN ; it will be convenient to let a!(p) denote the agent to
whom s assigns ! at the belief prole p, that is,
a!(p) = i, ! 2 si(p): (2)
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Super-strategyproofness Lemma. The assignment rule s associated with a strat-
egyproof and ex-post ecient SCF ' is super-strategyproof.
Proof. Let ' be a strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF and let s be the assignment
rule associated with it through (1). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist
i;M such that i 2M  N; p 2 PN ; and p0i 2 P such that pi(sM(p0i; p i)) > pi(sM(p)):
Choose v 2 VN such that (v; p); (v; (p0i; p i)) 2 DN and vi((vj)) = 1 for all j 2 M
and vi((vj)) = 0 for all j 2 N nM: Then,X
!2

pi(!)vi('(v; (p
0
i; p i);!)) =
X
!2

pi(!)vi(a!(p0i;p i))
=
X
!2
:a!(p0i;p i)2M
pi(!)
= pi(sM(p
0
i; p i))
> pi(sM(p))
=
X
!2
:a!(p)2M
pi(!)
=
X
!2

pi(!)vi(a!(p))
=
X
!2

pi(!)vi('(v; p;!));
contradicting the assumption that ' is strategyproof. 
Call an assignment rule s non-bossy if, for all i 2 N; p 2 PN and p0i 2 P ,
si(p) = si(p
0
i; p i) ) s(p) = s(p0i; p i): Non-bossiness says that no agent can aect
another agent's share without aecting her own.
Non-Bossiness Corollary. The assignment rule s associated with a strategyproof
and ex-post ecient SCF ' is non-bossy.
Proof. Given the super-strategyproofness lemma, it suces to show that every
super-strategyproof assignment rule s is non-bossy. Let s be super-strategyproof and
suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist i; j 2 N; p 2 PN and p0i 2 P
such that si(p) = si(p
0
i; p i) and sj(p) 6= sj(p0i; p i): By super-strategyproofness ap-
plied to M = fi; jg and because pi is injective, pi(sij(p)) > pi(sij(p0i; p i)); hence
pi(sj(p)) > pi(sj(p
0
i; p i)): Since such a strict inequality holds for every j such that
sj(p) 6= sj(p0i; p i); we have 1 =
P
j2N pi(sj(p)) >
P
j2N pi(sj(p
0
i; p i)) = 1, a contra-
diction. 
We are now ready to characterize the local behavior of a super-strategyproof
assignment rule. Dene H = ffA;Bg : ; 6= A;B  
 and A \B = ;g ; the set of
pairs of disjoint nonempty events. Two beliefs pi; qi 2 P will be called fA;Bg-
adjacent if
(pi(A)  pi(B))(qi(A)  qi(B)) < 0 and
(pi(C)  pi(D))(qi(C)  qi(D)) > 0 for fC;Dg 2 H n ffA;Bgg :
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We say that pi; qi are adjacent if they are fA;Bg-adjacent for some fA;Bg 2 H.
Adjacency is an ordinal property. Every belief pi 2 P generates a likelihood
ordering R(pi) over events dened by AR(pi)B , pi(A)  pi(B): Call two beliefs
pi; qi ordinally equivalent if R(pi) = R(qi): If pi; qi are adjacent and p
0
i is ordinally
equivalent to pi; then p
0
i; qi are adjacent. Two beliefs are adjacent if the likelihood
orderings they generate dier on a single pair of disjoint nonempty events.
Example 1. Let 
 = f1; 2; 3g and consider the simplex  depicted in Figure 1.
Every point in  implicitly denes a measure pi 2 P, where P denotes the closure
of P in [0; 1]2
 : Every line segment corresponds to (the intersection with  of) the
hyperplane pi(A) = pi(B) generated by some pair of disjoint events fA;Bg 2 H. Each
connected component of the complement of (the union of) these line segments denes
a region of ordinally equivalent beliefs: the shaded area is an example. Two beliefs
are adjacent if they lie on the same side of all but one hyperplane. For instance, the
beliefs p1i ; p
2
i ; which lie on the same side of all hyperplanes except pi(f2g) = pi(f3g),
are ff2g ; f3gg-adjacent. These beliefs generate the likelihood relations
R(p1i ) = f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1g ; f2g ; f3g ;
R(p2i ) = f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f2; 3g ; f1g ; f3g ; f2g ;
where events are listed in decreasing order of likelihood. Note that R(p1i ) and R(p
1
i )
disagree not only on f2g ; f3g but, as a consequence, also on f1; 2g ; f1; 3g: this does
not contradict the denition of adjacency because f1; 2g ; f1; 3g intersect.
Local Bilaterality Lemma. Let s be a super-strategyproof assignment rule. Let
fA;Bg 2 H and let i 2 N; p 2 PN ; p0i 2 P be such that pi; p0i are fA;Bg-adjacent
and pi(A) > pi(B): Then, either (i) s(p) = s(p
0
i; p i) or (ii) there exists j 2 N n i
such that
si(p) n si(p0i; p i) = A = sj(p0i; p i) n sj(p);
si(p
0
i; p i) n si(p) = B = sj(p) n sj(p0i; p i);
sk(p) = sk(p
0
i; p i) for all k 2 N n fi; jg :
This is a complete description of the local behavior of s: By reporting a belief
adjacent to her own, an agent i can only change the event that is assigned to her
and one other agent j. Moreover, if the assignment is indeed modied, i and j
must precisely exchange the disjoint events that have been switched in i's likelihood
ordering.
Proof. Fix a super-strategyproof (hence also non-bossy) assignment rule s: Let
fA;Bg 2 H and let i 2 N; p 2 PN ; p0i 2 P be such that pi; p0i are fA;Bg-adjacent
and pi(A) > pi(B):
Step 1. We show that for all M  N such that i 2M; either (i) sM(p) = sM(p0i; p i)
or (ii) sM(p) n sM(p0i; p i) = A and sM(p0i; p i) n sM(p) = B:
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To see this, suppose (i) fails. Dene AM = sM(p) n sM(p0i; p i) and BM =
sM(p
0
i; p i) n sM(p): These sets are disjoint and super-strategyproofness of s implies
that both are nonempty; hence, they belong to H. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that AM 6= A or BM 6= B: Since pi; p0i are fA;Bg-adjacent, their associated likelihood
orderings must agree on the ranking of AM ; BM : either (a) pi(AM) > pi(BM) and
p0i(AM) > p
0
i(BM); or (b) pi(AM) < pi(BM) and p
0
i(AM) < p
0
i(BM): If (a) holds, then
p0i(sM(p)) > p
0
i(sM(p
0
i; p i)) whereas if (b) holds, then pi(sM(p
0
i; p i)) > pi(sM(p)):
Each of these two inequalities contradicts super-strategyproofness.
Step 2. Applying Step 1 with M = fig, either (i) si(p) = si(p0i; p i) or (ii) si(p) n
si(p
0
i; p i) = A and si(p
0
i; p i) n si(p) = B:
If (i) holds, non-bossiness of s implies s(p) = s(p0i; p i), and we are done.
If (ii) holds, let j 2 N n i: Applying Step 1 with M = fi; jg = ij, we have either
(a) sij(p) = sij(p
0
i; p i) or (b) sij(p) n sij(p0i; p i) = A and sij(p0i; p i) n sij(p) = B: If
(a) holds, then (ii) implies
sj(p
0
i; p i) n sj(p) = A and sj(p) n sj(p0i; p i) = B (3)
whereas if (b) holds, (ii) implies
sj(p) = sj(p
0
i; p i): (4)
By feasibility, (3) can hold for at most one agent j 2 N n i. Because of (ii), it
must hold for exactly one such agent. Since (4) holds for every other agent j 2 N n i,
the proof is complete. 
6 Proof of the theorem: the bilateral consensus
and bilateral dictatorship lemmas
The rest of the proof of the theorem consists in exploiting the Local Bilaterality
lemma to show that a super-strategyproof assignment rule is a C-BD-BC union. Fix
a super-strategyproof assignment rule s : PN ! S. Let 
0;
1;
2 denote the sets of
states whose assignment is either constant, varies with the belief of a single agent, or
with the beliefs of at least two agents. That is, using the denition of a! in (2),
(i) ! 2 
0 , a! is constant on PN ;
(ii) ! 2 
1 ,

there exist i 2 N; p 2 PN ; and p0i 2 P such that a!(p) 6= a!(p0i; p i)

and

a!(:; p j) is constant on P for all j 6= i and p j 2 PNnj

,
(iii) ! 2 
2 , there exist distinct agents i; j 2 N; p; q 2 PN ; and p0i; q0j 2 P such
that a!(p) 6= a!(p0i; p i) and a!(q) 6= a!(q0j; q j):
By denition, f
0;
1;
2g is a partition of 
: In particular, the denition in (iii)
allows the assignment of states in 
2 to vary with the beliefs of more than two agents.
Moreover, the set of agents to whom a state in 
2 may potentially be assigned is a
priori unrestricted.
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We proceed by considering the states in 
2 rst. We show that, in fact, these
states can only be assigned to two distinct agents, and the assignment must be based
on the beliefs of these two agents only. More specically, states in 
2 must be assigned
through bilateral consensus:
Bilateral Consensus Lemma. For every ! 2 
2 there exists a unique event
E!  
2 containing ! and there exists a bilaterally consensual E!-assignment rule
s! such that
si(p) \ E! = s!i (p j E!)
for all p 2 PN and i 2 N .
The long proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendices B and C, but here is a
quick overview. The proof is \by contagion".
Appendix B derives a \semi-global" characterization. For any given state ! 2 
2;
we x a prole  of beliefs over 
 n !; and we consider the sub-domain PN() of all
belief proles on 
 generating the same prole of likelihood orderings as  on the
subsets of 
 n !: Using the Local Bilaterality lemma, we show that there exist two
disjoint events A;B; whose union contains !; such that the restriction of s to A [B
coincides with a bilaterally consensual (A [ B)-assignment rule on the sub-domain
PN().
In Appendix C, we consider every belief prole (0i;  i) over 
 n! such that 0i is
adjacent to i for some agent i and, in a series of \contagion lemmas", we describe
how the behavior of the restriction of s to A [ B on the sub-domain PN(0i;  i) is
linked to the behavior of its restriction to A [B on PN(): Using the connectedness
of the set of all beliefs on 
 n !; we conclude that the restriction of s to A [ B
must be bilaterally consensual on the whole domain PN : The claim follows by setting
E! = A [B:
The Bilateral Consensus lemma fully determines the behavior of s on 
2: For
any two states !; !0 2 
2; since there exist a bilaterally consensual E!-rule s! and a
bilaterally consensual E!
0
-rule s!
0
such that si(p)\E! = s!i (p j E!) and si(p)\E!0 =
s!
0
i (p j E!0) for all i 2 N; we must have either (i) E! = E!0 and s! = s!0 ; or (ii)
E! \ E!0 = ;. This delivers at once the following corollary:
Bilateral Consensus Corollary. There exists a partition f
tgT2t=1 of 
2 and, for
each t = 1; :::; T2, a bilaterally consensual 

t-assignment rule st such that
si(p) \ 
2 = [T2t=1sti(p j 
t)
for all p 2 PN and i 2 N:
Next, we turn next to the assignment of the states in 
1: Let 
11 be the subset of
those states in 
1 whose assignment varies with the beliefs of agent 1: We show that
these states are assigned by bilateral dictatorship of agent 1:
Bilateral Dictatorship Lemma. There exist a set N1  N n 1; a partition

j11
	
j2N1 of 
11; and for each j 2 N1 a (1; j)-dictatorial 

j
11-assignment rule s
j
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such that
si(p) \ 
11 = [j2N1sji (p j 
j11) (5)
for all p 2 PN and i 2 N:
The proof is in Appendix D, but let us outline it here. Consider the family of
all subsets of 
11 that are assigned to agent 1 at some belief prole. We begin by
showing that s1(p) \ 
11 maximizes p1 over that family whenever p1 is a so-called

11-dominant belief {one in which only the probability dierences between events in

11 are large. We then use the Local Bilaterality lemma to extend this observation to
all belief proles p: The next and crucial step consists in proving that every state in

11 can only be allocated to a single agent other than 1: The set 
11 can therefore be
partitioned into a collection of subsets


j11
	
such that every state in 
j11 is allocated
to either 1 or j; and super-strategyproofness can be used to show that s1(p) \ 
j11
maximizes p1 over the family of all subsets of 

j
11 that are assigned to agent 1 at some
belief prole. The argument is completed by appealing to non-bossiness.
We have stated the Bilateral Dictatorship lemma for agent 1, but a corresponding
lemma obviously holds for every agent. It now follows from these Bilateral Dictator-
ship lemmas, the Bilateral Consensus corollary, and the denition of 
0; that s is a
C-BD-BC union. Together with the Top Selection lemma, this completes the proof
of the Theorem.
7 Concluding comments
We have shown that strategyproof and ex-post ecient social choice functions are top
selections generated by assignment rules that are unions of constant, bilaterally dicta-
torial, or bilaterally consensual sub-rules. Thus, under uncertainty, strategyproofness
and ex-post eciency are compatible with a form of consensuality that cannot be
achieved under risk. This generates eciency gains: any random dictatorship (that
is, any SCF generated by a constant assignment rule) is Pareto-dominated by some
SCF generated by a consensual rule.
We conclude by mentioning some open problems.
(1) How should we choose between the social choice functions identied in our
theorem? Assuming a given (for instance uniform) distribution over the set of all
preference proles, one could search for social choice functions that maximize some
measure of expected welfare {the expected sum of normalized utilities for instance. Al-
ternatively, one could proceed axiomatically and impose properties that complement
strategyproofness and ex-post eciency. It is a corollary of our theorem, however,
that no strategyproof SCF is (ex-ante Pareto) ecient. Anonymity and neutrality
are also impossible. On the other hand, it also follows from our theorem that all
strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCFs are group-strategyproof: the members of a
group cannot all benet from jointly misrepresenting their preferences. It would be
interesting to explore what lower bounds can be guaranteed on each agent's welfare.
14
(2) Strategyproof SCFs that are not ex-post ecient deserve to be studied. If
there is an odd number of agents, majority voting between two pre-specied acts is
clearly strategyproof. But more exible strategyproof SCFs are possible. Partition
the state space into a collection of events. For each event specify two \sub-acts",
that is, two mappings from that event into the set of outcomes, and apply majority
voting to choose between these two sub-acts. Let the chosen act be the concatenation
of all the chosen sub-acts. The additive separability of subjective expected utility
preferences guarantees that this SCF is strategyproof; it is also anonymous. Non-
anonymous variants of such SCFs can be dened by using a committee rule (rather
than majority voting) to decide between the two pre-specied sub-acts on each event.
(3) We conducted our analysis under the assumption that all acts are feasible.
While this unconstrained social choice framework is a natural benchmark, applica-
tions will typically require imposing constraints on the set of feasible acts. The class
of strategyproof and ex-post ecient social choice functions will generally depend in
a subtle way upon these feasibility constraints, but our results certainly provide a
good starting point for the study of any such problem. A similar generalization to
constrained sets of alternatives was successfully achieved in the literature on strat-
egyproofness on rich domains of additively separable preferences originally dened
over product sets: see in particular Barbera, Masso and Neme (2005) and Regen
and Svensson (2012).
(4) In many contexts, it will also be natural to impose restrictions on preferences.
An interesting case is that of shareholders of a rm choosing acts with monetary out-
comes {the prots to be shared. Here all agents have the same monotonic preference
ordering over outcomes but not necessarily the same valuation functions or the same
beliefs. While the unconstrained problem is uninteresting {the constant act choosing
the highest prot level in all states is dominant{, the problem of choosing acts under
constraints is entirely nontrivial.
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8 Appendix A: proof of the Top Selection lemma
We rst dene two consequences of strategyproofness. Given a pair (vi; pi), let
Epivi (f) :=
P
!2

pi(!)vi(f(!)) denote agent i's expected utility associated with the act
f . We say that a SCF ~' : DN ! X
 is misvaluation-proof if no agent ever benets
from distorting her valuation function (while reporting her actual belief), that is, for
all i 2 N , (v; p) 2 DN and v0i 2 V i,
Epivi ( ~'(v; p))  Epivi ( ~'((v0i; v i); p)) :
Likewise ~' : DN ! X
 will be called misbelief-proof if: for all i 2 N , (v; p) 2 DN
and p0i 2 P i,
Epivi ( ~'(v; p))  Epivi ( ~'(v; (p0i; p i)))
This says that no agent should ever benet from distorting her belief pi (while truth-
fully reporting vi). Obviously, just as misvaluation-proofness, misbelief-proofness is
implied by strategyproofness.
Let ' : DN ! X
 be a strategyproof and ex-post ecient SCF. Unless explicitly
specied otherwise, we assume in what follows that p 2 PN is xed (but arbitrary),
and we write '(v) and Evi instead of the respective '(v; p) and E
pi
vi
. Given the xed
p, the set of i's admissible valuation functions is Vpi := fv 2 V j (vi; pi) 2 Dg; and
(with a slight abuse of notation) we write Vp := Vp1  : : : Vpn . For any x 2 X and
f 2 X
, we let fx := f! 2 
 j f(!) = xg. Likewise, we will often write 'x(v; p).
The preliminary result below says that, if the chosen acts at two given proles
(v; v0) disagree only in states where either a1 or a2 is selected, then they must coincide
as long as every agent's ordering of a1 and a2 does not change from v to v
0.
Lemma 1. Invariance for binary-dierentiated acts
If a1; a2 2 X and v; v0 2 Vp are such that (vi(a1)  vi(a2)) (v0i(a1)  v0i(a2)) > 0 for all
i 2 N , then ['x(v) = 'x(v); 8x 6= a1; a2]) ['(v) = '(v0)] :
Proof. The result follows from the fact that an agent's preferences over binary-
dierentiated acts f; f 0 (that is, acts that may only dier in states where a1 or a2
is chosen) remain unchanged as long as her ordering of these two outcomes is the
same.
The Monotonicity lemma below states that, if the chosen act changes as agent i's
reported valuation of the outcome a increases (all else equal), then the probability
assigned to this outcome a in the chosen act must increase as well.
Lemma 2. Monotonicity
If a 2 X, i 2 N , v; w 2 Vp are such that v i = w i, vi(x) = wi(x) for all x 6= a, and
1 > vi(a) > wi(a)  0; then ['(v) 6= '(w)]) [pi ('a(v)) > pi ('a(w))] :
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Proof. Fix i; a; v; w as in the statement of Lemma 2 and suppose that '(v) = f 6=
g = '(w). Next, for any x 2 X and z 2 [0; 1), let vzi (x) =

vi(x); if x 6= a
z; if x = a
and
dene the following function of z:
fg(z) :=
X
!2

pi(!) [v
z
i (f(!))  vzi (g(!))] :
Factoring out z and reshuing, one can rewrite fg(z) as
fg(z) = [pi(f
a)  pi(ga)]| {z }

z +
X
!=2fa
pi(!)vi(f(!)) 
X
!=2ga
pi(!)vi(g(!))| {z }

:
Thus, fg(z) =   z +  is a linear function of z 2 [0; 1).
Moreover, observe that vzi =

wi; if z = wi(a)
vi; if z = vi(a)
. Therefore, misvaluation-
proofness implies: (i) fg(wi(a)) < 0 and (ii) fg(vi(a)) > 0. Given that fg is
linear and wi(a) < vi(a), we necessarily have that the slope is positive, that is to say,
 = pi ('
a(v))  pi ('a(w)) > 0.
The next lemma asserts the following: ceteris paribus, as an agent i's reported
valuation of her second-best outcome a2 gets innitely close to 1 (the valuation of her
top a1), there necessarily comes a point where (i) the chosen act becomes constant
and (ii) for the two possible orders of i's two top outcomes a1 and a2, the respective
outcomes chosen must be the same in each state where a1 and a2 are not selected.
Lemma 3. Invariance at the bottom (with close tops)
Consider a1; a2 2 X, with a1 6= a2, and x i 2 N , v 2 Vp such that vi(a1) = 1. Let
v^mi ; v
m
i 2 Vpi be such that

v^mi (a1) = 1 > v^
m
i (a2) = 1  1=m > v^mi (x) = vi(x);
vmi (a2) = 1 > v
m
i (a1) = 1  1=m > vmi (x) = vi(x);
for
any m  mvi0 > 1 and any x =2 fa1; a2g. Then the following statements hold:
(i) 9f^ ; f 2 X
 and 9 ~m 2 IN such that: m > ~m)
h
'(v^mi ; v i) = f^ and '(v
m
i ; v i) = f
i
.
(ii) For all x 2 X n fa1; a2g, we have f^x = fx.
Proof. Let a; b 2 X, i 2 N , v 2 Vp, v^mi ; vmi 2 Vpi satisfy the conditions of the
statement of Lemma 3.
(i) Suppose by contradiction that (i) is false. Then one of the two sequences
f^m := '(v^
m
i ; v i); fm := '(v^
m
i ; v i) is not stationary.
4 Assuming without loss of
generality that f^m is not stationary, there exists a subsequence of f^m (say, f^mk)
such that f^mk 6= fmk+1 , for all k 2 IN (where mk increases with k). Given that
4We say that a sequence (qm)m2IN is stationary if there exists m 2 IN s.t.: m > m) qm = qm+1:
In words, a stationary sequence is one that becomes constant after a nite number of steps.
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v^
mk+1
i (a2) = 1   1=mk+1 > 1   1=mk = v^mki (a2) and v^mki (x) = v^mk+1i (x) 8x 6= b, it
comes from Lemma 2 that pi(f^mk+1) > pi(f^mk). Hence, for any k^  1, we may write:
pi

f^a2m0

< pi

f^a2m1

< : : : < pi

f^a2m
k^ 1

< pi

f^a2m
k^

< pi

f^a2m
k^+1

< : : :
Since pi is injective, we have thus found an innite sequence (f^mk)k0 of pairwise
distinct acts. But this is impossible because the set of acts, X
, is nite.
(ii) By way of contradiction, let us assume that f^x 6= fx for some x 2 X nfa1; a2g.
We dene two new acts g^ and g as follows:(
g^(!) = f^(!); 8! =2 f^a1 [ f^a2 ;
g^(!) = a1;8! 2 f^a1 [ f^a2 ; and

g(!) = f(!);8! =2 fa1 [ fa2 ;
g(!) = a1;8! 2 fa1 [ fa2 : (6)
Note that g^ 6= g because there exists x 6= a1; a2 such that f^x 6= fx. Thus, since the
pair (vi; pi) denes a linear ordering over the set of acts, we must have Evi(g^) 6= Evi(g):X
x6=a;b
pi(g^
x)vi(x) + pi(f^
a1 [ f^a2)vi(a1) 6=
X
x 6=a;b
pi( f
x)vi(x) + pi( f
a1 [ fa2)vi(a1):
Without loss of generality, suppose that Evi(g^) Evi(g) > 0. It then comes from the
above equation, and the fact that vi(a1) = 1, thatX
x6=a;b
(pi(g^
x)  pi(gx)) vi(x) +

pi(f^
a1 [ f^a2)  pi( fa1 [ fa2)

> 0:
Hence, since g^x = f^x;8x 6= a1; a2 (gx = fx;8x 6= a1; a2) from Equation (6), we
have
" :=
X
x 6=a;b

pi(f^
x)  pi( fx)

vi(x) + pi(f^
a1 [ f^a2)  pi( fa1 [ fa2) > 0: (7)
Consider now m  ~m, where ~m is dened in (i). Then we have f^m = f^ and fm = f
and, given that vi(a2) = 1, v
m
i (a1) = 1  1=m, it follows that
Evmi (f^)  Evmi ( f) =
X
x2X

pi(f^
x)  pi( fx)

vi(x)
=
X
x 6=a1;a2
(pi(f^
x)  pi( fx))vi(x) + (pi(f^a1)  pi( fa1))vmi (a1)
+(pi(f^
a1)  pi( fa2))vmi (a2)
=
X
x 6=a1;a2
(pi(f^
x)  pi( fx))vi(x) + pi(f^a1 [ f^a2)  pi( fa1 [ fa2)
  1
m
(pi(f^
a1)  pi( fa1))
= "  1
m
(pi(f^
a1)  pi( fa1)):
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Since " > 0 from (7), and lim
m!1
1
m
(pi(f^
a1)   pi( fa1)) = 0, there exists m  ~m such
that 1
m
(pi(f^
a1)   pi( fa1)) < ", for m  m. Hence, for all m  m  ~m, we nally
get Evmi (f^)   Evmi ( f) > 0. But this is a contradiction since, together, misvaluation-
proofness, f = fm = '(vmi ; v i) and f^ = f^m = '(v^
m
i ; v i) (for all m  m) imply
that we must rather have Evmi (
f)  Evmi (f^) > 0.
Lemma 4. Top selection in the case of two agents.
Let N = f1; 2g; a1; a2 2 X; and v; v02 Vp: If (vi) = (v0i) = ai for all i 2 N; then
'(v) = '(v0) 2 fa1; a2g
 :
Proof. Fix N = f1; 2g; a1; a2 2 X; and v; v02 Vp such that (vi) = (v0i) = ai for
i = 1; 2: If a1 = a2, ex-post eciency alone delivers the desired result. In what
follows, assume a1 6= a2. We prove the claims below.
Claim 1. For any x; y 2 X, let Txy := fw 2 Vp : w1(x) = w2(y) = 1g and call
DOMxy the subset of V containing all proles w 2 Txy such that any z 2 X n fx; yg
is ex-post dominated by x or y. Then there exists fxy 2 fx; yg
 such that
'(w) = '(w0) = fxy; 8x; y 2 X; 8w;w0 2 DOMxy:
To prove Claim 1, x x; y 2 X and ~w 2 DOMxy and observe that, by ex-post
eciency, we have fxy := '( ~w) 2 fx; yg
. In addition, remark that for any agent
i 2 f1; 2g, we have (wi(x) wi(y))(w0i(x) w0i(y)) > 0 for all w;w0 2 DOMxy. Thus,
Lemma 1 yields the desired result: '(w) = '(w0) = fxy; for all w;w0 2 DOMxy.
Note that, in particular, Claim 1 implies that '(w) = '(w0) = fa1a2 2 fa1; a2g
 for
all w;w0 2 DOMa1a2 . To prove Lemma 4, it thus suces to show that '(w) = fa1a2
for any w 2 Ta1a2 n DOMa1a2 . Let us then consider a xed v 2 Ta1a2 n DOMa1a2 .
By way of contradiction, suppose that '(v) 6= fa1a2 . Then there exists b 2
X n fa1; a2g such that 'b(v) 6= ; |otherwise, Lemma 1 would yield '(v) = fa1a2 .
Moreover, by monotonicity (Lemma 2), remark that it is not restrictive to assume
that b is the second-best outcome for both players, that is,
v1(a1) = 1 > v1(b) > v1(x);8x 6= a1; b; (8)
v2(a2) = 1 > v2(b) > v2(x);8x 6= a2; b:
Next, we dene v^m2 ; v
m
2 2 Vp2 by:5
v^m2 (a2) = 1 > v^
m
2 (b) = 1  1=m > v^m2 (x) = v2(x) (9)
vm2 (b) = 1 > v
m
2 (a2) = 1  1=m > vm2 (x) = vi(x); (10)
5Since the set of acts X
 is nite, note that the starting point mv20 of the sequence fv^2gmmv20 ,
can be conveniently chosen so as to have v^m2 2 Vp2 for all m  mv20 (and likewise for vm2 ).
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for any m  mv20 and any x =2 fa2; bg. We then prove the additional claims below.
Claim 2. For all m  mv20 and u1 2 Vp1 such that (u1; v^m2 ) 2 Ta1a2 , we have:
'(u1; v^
m
2 ) 6= fa1a2 )

p1('
a2(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p1(f
a2
a1a2
) and p2('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p2(f
a1
a1a2
)

:
Let us prove Claim 2. Consider m  mv20 and u1 2 Vp1 such that (u1; v^m2 ) 2 Ta1a2 ;
and suppose that '(u1; v^
m
2 ) 6= fa1a2 . Then we know from Claim 1 that (u1; v^m2 ) =2
DOMa1a2 ; but dening w by
w2(a1) = 1  1=(2m) > w2(b) = 1  1=m
w2(x) = v^
m
2 (x) for all x 6= a1;
we get (u1; w2) 2 DOMa1a2 and hence, by Claim 1, '(u1; w2) = fa1a2 . Observe
that w2 obtains from v^
m
2 by merely raising the value of a1: thus, it follows from
monotonicity (Lemma 2) that p2('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p2(f
a1
a1a2
) = p2('(u1; w2)). The proof
of p1('
a2(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p1(f
a2
a1a2
) is similar and will be omitted.
Claim 3. There exists " 2 (0; 1) such that, for any u1 2 Vp1 , we have:
[u1(a1) = 1 > "
  u1(x); 8x 6= a1]) ['(u1; v^m2 ) = fa1a2 ; 8m  mv20 ]:
To prove Claim 3, dene  := min
E;E0  

E 6= E0
jp1(E)  p1(E 0)j and let " = jXj > 0. Let
us x m  mv20 and u1 2 V1 such that u1(a1) = 1 > " > u1(x) for all x 6= a1; and
by contradiction suppose that '(u1; v^
m
2 ) 6= fa1a2 . Then it follows from Claim 2 that
p2('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p2(f
a1
a1a2
) and, therefore, 'a1(u1; v^
m
2 ) 6= fa1a1a2 . Since p1 is injective,
this means that either p1('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p1(f
a1
a1a2
) or p1('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) > p1(f
a1
a1a2
). We
show below that either case leads to a contradiction.
Suppose rst that p1('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) < p1(f
a1
a1a2
). Then, recalling the denition of ,
we have p1(f
a1
a1a2
)  p1('a1(u1; v^m2 ))  ; and one can hence write
Eu1(fa1a2)  Eu1('(u1; v^m2 ))
= p1(f
a1
a1a2)  p1('a1(u1; v^m2 )) +
X
x6=a1
[p1(f
x
a1a2)  p1('x(u1; v^m2 ))]
"z }| {
u1(x)
 p1(fa1a1a2)  p1('a1(u1; v^m2 ))| {z }
="jXj
 "
X
x 6=a1
p1(fxa1a2)  p1('x(u1; v^m2 ))| {z }
1
 "jXj   " (jXj   1) = " > 0:
But this contradicts misvaluation-proofness: agent 1 will deviate from u1 to u
0
1 such
that (u01; v^
m
2 ) 2 DOMa1a2 and obtain the preferred act fa1a2 .
Suppose now that p1('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 )) > p1(f
a1
a1a2
) and consider w1 2 Vp1 such that
w1(a1) = 1 > "
 > w2(a2) > w2(x) for all x 6= a2. Note that (w1; v^m2 ) 2 DOMa1a2 ;
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hence, '(w1; v^
m
2 ) = fa1a2 . But then agent 1 prefers reporting u1 to telling the truth
when receiving w1:
Ew1('(u1; v^
m
2 ))  Ew1(fa1a2)
= p1('
a1(u1; v^
m
2 ))  p1(fa1a1a2) +
X
x 6=a1
[p1('
x(u1; v^
m
2 ))  p1(fxa1a2)]
"z }| {
w1(x)
 p1('a1(u1; v^m2 ))  p1(fa1a1a2)| {z }
="jXj
 "
X
x 6=a1
p1(fxa1a2)  p1('x(u1; v^m2 ))| {z }
1
 "jXj   " (jXj   1) = " > 0:
This also contradicts misvaluation-proofness of '; and Claim 3 is shown.
To conclude the proof of Lemma 4, let us now x u1 2 Vp1 such that
u1(a1) = 1 > "
 =

jXj  u1(x); 8x 6= a1; (11)
and consider the sequences dened by '(v1; v^
m
2 ) and '(u1; v^
m
2 ), for m  mv20 . By
Lemma 3-(i), there exist f^v1 2 X
 and ~mv1  mv20 such that: '(v1; v^m2 ) = f^v1 , for all
m  ~mv1 . And Lemma 3-(ii) then gives
p2('
a1(v1; v^
m
2 )) = p2(f^
a1
v1
) = p2('
a1(v1; v
m
2 )); 8m  ~mv1 : (12)
On the other hand, it follows from Claim 3 that the sequence '(u1; v^
m
2 ) is constant.
Precisely, '(u1; v^
m
2 ) = fa1a2 for any m; and hence, applying Lemma 3-(ii), we get
p2(f^
a1
u1
) = p2(f
a1
a1a2
) = p2('
a1(u1; v
m
2 ));8m  ~mu1 : (13)
Next, since 'b(v) 6= ;, note from monotonicity (Lemma 2) that p2('b(v1; v^m2 ) > 0
and therefore '(v1; v^
m
2 ) 6= fa1a2 for any m  ~mv1 ; and it then follows from Claim
2 that p2('
a1(v1; v^
m
2 )) = p2(f^
a1
v1
) < p2(f
a1
a1a2
). Plugging this inequality in (12)-(13)
nally gives
p2(f^
a1
v1
) = p2('
a1(v1; v
m
2 )) < p2('
a1(u1; v
m
2 )) = p2(f
a1
a1a2
); 8m  maxf ~mv1 ; ~mu1g (14)
But note from (14) that the inequality p2('
a1(v1; v
m
2 )) < p2('
a1(u1; v
m
2 )) contradicts
Claim 1. Indeed, remark from (8), (9) and (11) that (v1; v
m
2 ); (u1; v
m
2 ) 2 DOMa1b; and
by Claim 1 we should rather have p2('
a1(v1; v
m
2 )) = p2('
a1(u1; v
m
2 )) for any m.
We emphasize that our proof of Lemma 4 only makes use of misvaluation-proofness
and ex-post eciency; it does not require the full force of strategyproofness. Indeed,
up to now, we have kept the belief prole xed.
Next, using an induction argument, we prove in Lemma 5 below that ' selects
only tops at each prole where two players report the same top. The statement and
proof of this result require variations of the belief prole p; we hence return to our
original notation, writing '(v; p) and Epivi rather than just '(v) and Evi .
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Lemma 5. Induction lemma
Suppose that jN j = n  3. Assume by induction that for all S such that jSj  n  1
every misvaluation-proof, misbelief-proof and ex-post ecient SCF ~' : DS ! X
 is a
top and tops-only selection. Then, for any distinct k; l 2 N and any (v; p) 2 DN , we
have: [(vk) = (vl)]) '(v; p) 2 f(vi) : i 2 Ng
:
Proof. We will prove Lemma 5 in two steps. Suppose that the conditions in the
statement are satised; and let us x k; l 2 N such that k 6= l.
Step 1. For any (v; p) 2 DN such that vk = vl and pk = pl, we have '(v; p) 2 f(vi) :
i 2 Ng
. Moreover, we have '(v0; p) = '(v; p) for any v0 2 Vp such that v0k = v0l and
((vi))i2N = ((v0i))i2N .
Proof. Let N l := N n l and consider ~' : DN l ! X
, dened by:
8(w; q) 2 DN l ; ~'(w; q) = '(
2VNz }| {
(w; wk|{z}
l
);
2PNz }| {
(q; qk|{z}
l
)): (15)
That is to say, ~'(w; q) obtains as the decision under ' at the prole of DN constructed
from (w; q) by assigning to agent l the same valuation function and beliefs as agent
k. It is straightforward to see from its denition that ~' is ex-post ecient (since '
is). We show next that ~' is also misvaluation-proof and misbelief-proof.
It is easy to see from (15) that misreporting vi or pi will never benet any agent
i 2 N l n k (it would contradict strategyproofness of '). To show that agent k 2
N l cannot protably misreport either, pick an arbitrary pair (w; q) 2 DN l and let
(w0k; q
0
k) 2 D. Since ' is misvaluation-proof, agent k cannot protably misreport w0k
when receiving (wk; qk):
Eqkwk( ~'((w k; w
0
k); q) = E
qk
wk
('((w k; w0k|{z}
k
; w0k|{z}
l
); (q; qk)))  Eqkwk('((w k; wk; w0k); (q; qk)))
(16)
Likewise, agent l cannot protably misreport w0k when receiving (wk; qk), that is,
Eqkwk('((w k; wk; w
0
k); (q; qk)))  Eqkwk('((w k; wk; wk); (q; qk)) = Eqkwk( ~'(w; q)) (17)
Combining (16) and (17) thus gives Eqkwk( ~'((w k; w
0
k); q)  Eqkwk( ~'(w; q)), which shows
that ~' is misvaluation proof.
Using the same procedure, we also get Eqkwk( ~'((w; (q k; q
0
k)))  Eqkwk( ~'(w; q)); and
hence ~' is misbelief-proof. It thus follows from the induction hypothesis in the state-
ment of Lemma 5 that ~' is a top (and tops-only) selection. That is to say, for
any (v; p) 2 DN such that vk = vl and pk = pl, the following results hold: (i)
~'(v l; p l) = '(v; p) 2 f(vi); i 2 Ng
; (ii) ~'(v0 l; p l) = '(v0; p) = '(v; p) for any
v0 2 Vp such that v0k = v0l and ((vi))i2N = ((v0i))i2N
Step 2. For all (v; p) 2 DN such that vk = vl, we have '(v; p) 2 f(vi) : i 2 Ng
.
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Proof. In order to complete this step, let us rst state some preliminary results.
Preliminary 1. Let (u; q) 2 DN and suppose that x 2 X satises ui(x) 2 [0; 1), for
any i 2 N . Then there exists "u > 0 such that: (u0; q) 2 DN and '(u0; q) = '(u; q),
whenever u0 2 VN satises

u0i(x) = ui(x); if x 6= x
ju0i(x)  ui(x)j < "u
for each i 2 N .
The proof of Preliminary 1 is left to the reader: it follows from the facts that (i)
the expected utility operator Eqiui() is a continuous function of ui; and (ii) all players
have identical preferences under (u; q) and (u0; q) if u and u0 are suciently close (the
decision must hence be the same by misvaluation-proofness). It is important to note
that "u may vary with u, but not with p.
Preliminary 2. Suppose that (ui; qi); (ui; q
0
i) 2 D. Then there exists a nite sequence
of beliefs fqti : t = 0; : : : ; Tg such that: (i) q0i = qi and qTi = q0i; (ii) (ui; qti) 2 D, for
every t = 0; : : : ; T ; for all t = 0; : : : ; T   1, we have at most one qi 2 [qti ; qt+1i ] such
that (ui; qi) =2 D.
The proof of Preliminary 2 is also omitted: it obtains as well from the continuity
of the expected utility function Eqiui , and the fact that the set of acts X

 is nite. In
words, Preliminary 2 means that, given a xed ui, any deviation from a belief qi to
another belief q0i can be decomposed as a sequence of deviations q
t
i ! qt+1i that are
elementary in the sense that the segment [qti ; q
t+1
i ] contains at most one qi such that
(ui; qi) =2 D.
Let us now proceed with the proof of Step 2. Fix (v; p) 2 DN such that vk = vl
and pk 6= pl; and suppose by contradiction that f := '(v; p) =2 f(vi) : i 2 Ng
.
Using Preliminary 2,6 we will without loss of generality assume that there exists a
unique pi 2 [pk; pl] such that (vk; pk) =2 D.
First, let g := '(v; (p kl; pk; pk)), h := '(v; (p kl; pl; pl)); and remark that, for any
pk 2 (pk; pk), misbelief-proofness or ' gives
'(v; (p kl; pk; pl)) = '(v; (p kl; pk; pl)) = f: (18)
Indeed, note that (vk; p

k) and (vk; pl) necessarily yield the same ranking of all acts
because there is no p0k 2 [pk; pl] n pk  (pk; pk) 3 pk such that (vk; p0k) =2 D. Likewise,
using misbelief-proofness of ~' (established in Step 1) yields
'(v; (p kl; pk; p

k))| {z }
=~'(v l;(p kl;pk))
= '(v; (p kl; pk; pk))| {z }
=~'(v l;(p kl;pk))
= g; 8p 2 (pk; pk) (19)
Second, we get from Step 1 that g = '(v; (p kl; pk; pk)) = ~'(v l; p l) 2 f(vi); i 2
Ng
 and also h = '(v; (p kl; pl; pl)) = ~'(v l; (p kl; pl)) 2 f(vi); i 2 Ng
. Note
6Note from Preliminary 2 that we are ignoring here the case where there exists no pk 2 [pk; pl]
such that (vk; pk) =2 D. In this case, (vk; pk) and (vk; pl) generate exactly the same ranking over the
set of acts X
; and hence misbelief-proofness of ' trivially gives the desired contradiction. We thus
focus on the interesting case, where there exists exactly one pk 2 [pk; pl] such that (vk; pk) =2 D.
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that f =2 fg; hg since both g and h are top selections (whereas f is not). Since
(v; p) = (v; (p kl; pk; pl)) obtains from (v; (p kl; pk; pk)) when agent l changes her
reported belief from pk to pl, misbelief-proofness of ' implies (a.1) E
pk
vk
(g) > Epkvk (f)
and (a.2) Eplvk(f) > E
pl
vk
(g). Doing the same for agent k, from (v; (p kl; pk; pl)) to
(v; (p kl; pl; pl)), we may write (b.1) Epkvk (f) > E
pk
vk
(h) and (b.2) Eplvk(h) > E
pl
vk
(f).
Finally, using misbelief-proofness of ~', which has been established in Step 1, we obtain
(c.1) Epkvk (g)  Epkvk (h) and (c.2) Epkvk (g)  Epkvk (h) |where the equalities hold only
if g = h. We distinguish two cases below.
Suppose rst that g = h. Then observe that (a.1) and (b.1) above respectively
become Epkvk (g) > E
pk
vk
(f) and Epkvk (f) > E
pk
vk
(g), and we obviously have a contradic-
tion.
Suppose now that g 6= h. Combining the intermediate value theorem with the
fact that pk is the only belief in [pk; pl] such that(vk; pk) =2 D, we get from (a.1) and
(a.2) that E pkvk (g) = E
pk
vk
(f). By the same token, using (c.1) and (c.2), note that we
must as well have E pkvk (g) = E
pk
vk
(h). That is to say,
E pkvk (g) :=
P
w2
 pk(w)vk(g(!)) =
P
w2
 pk(w)vk(f(!)) =: E
pk
vk
(f); (20)
E pkvk (g) :=
P
w2
 pk(w)vk(g(!)) =
P
w2
 pk(w)vk(h(!)) =: E
pk
vk
(h): (21)
Given that f := '(v; p) =2 f(vi) : i 2 Ng
, there necessarily exists (x; !) 2
X  
 such that vk(x) 2 [0; 1) and f(!) = x. Next, recall the denition of "v
(in Preliminary 1) and dene v0 2 VN by

v0i(x) = vi(x); if x 6= x
v0i(x
) = vi(x) + "v=2
for all i 2 N .
Note from this denition of v0 that v0i(x) = vi(x) for all i 2 N and all x 2 f(vj) : j 2
Ng. Combining that observation with the fact that g; h 2 f(vj) : j 2 Ng
, we may
use (20) to write
E pkv0k
(g) = E pkvk (g) :=
X
w2

pk(w)vk(g(!)) =
X
w2

pk(w)vk(h(!)) =: E
pk
vk
(h) = E pkv0k
(h):
(22)
Also, since v0i(x)  vi(x) for any x 2 X [with the strict inequality for x 2 f(
)], it
comes from (22) that
E pkv0k
(g) =
X
w2

pk(w)
=v0k(g(!))z }| {
vk(g(!)) =
X
w2

pk(w)vk(f(!)) <
X
w2

pk(w)v
0
k(f(!)) =: E
pk
v0k
(f):
(23)
Using the continuity of E
p0k
vk with respect to the belief p
0
k, Equation (23) implies that
there exists pk 2 (pk; pk) such that Ep

k
v0k
(g) < E
pk
v0k
(f). In addition, note that (vk; p

k) 2
D|because of our assumption that there exists no p0k 2 [pk; pl]npk such that (vk; p0k) =2
D. Hence, applying Preliminary 1 also gives (v0k; pk) 2 D and
'(v0; (p kl; pk; pl)) = '(v; (p kl; p

k; pl)) = f; (24)
where the last equality comes from (18).
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Finally, recalling from Step 1 that ~' is a tops-only selection |and noting that
(vi) = (v
0
i) for all i 2 N , we get
' (v0; (p kl; pk; pk)) = ~'(v0 l; p l) = ~'(v l; p l) = '(v; (p kl; pk; pk)): (25)
Combining (25) and (19) then gives ' (v0; (p kl; pk; p

k)) = g = '(v; (p kl; pk; pk)). But
remark that this is a contradiction to misbelief-proofness of '. Indeed, agent l will
protably deviate from (v0; (p kl; pk; p

k)) to (v
0; (p kl; pk; pl)) since we have v
0
l = v
0
k
and
E
pk
v0l
(g) = E
pk
v0k
(g) < E
pk
v0k
(f) = E
pk
v0l
(f);
' (v0; (p kl; pk; p

k)) = g;
' (v0; (p kl; pk; pl)) = f [from (24)]:
This concludes the proof of Step 2. Combining Step 1 and Step 2, we thus have
'(v; p) 2 f(vi) : i 2 Ng
 for all (v; p) 2 DN such that vk = vl:
For the case where n = 2, the top (and tops-only) property has been shown in
Lemma 4. The following lemma states this property for n  3.
Lemma 6. Top Selection (and tops-only) for n  3
Let jN j = n  3, An = (a1; : : : ; an) 2 XN and x p 2 PN . If v; v0 2 Vp are such that
(vi) = (v
0
i) = ai for all i 2 N = f1; : : : ; ng; then '(v; p) = '(v0; p) 2 fa1; : : : ; ang
.
Proof. Suppose that n  3; and x An = (a1; : : : ; an) 2 XN and p 2 PN . Next,
dene TAn := fv 2 Vp : vi(ai) = 1;8i 2 Ng and, for any v 2 TAn , let f^v :=
lim
1
'((v^m1 ; v 1); p). That is, f^v is the value taken by the stationary sequence '((v^
m
1 ; v 1); p)
for m large enough [recall Lemma 3-(i)]. We will prove the result by showing two
claims: (1) 9v 2 TAn such that '(v; p) 2 fa1; : : : ; ang
; (2) '(v; p) = '(v0; p) for all
v; v0 2 TAN .
Claim 1. There exists v00 2 TAn such that '(v00; p) 2 fa1; : : : ; ang
.
To prove Claim 1, we distinguish two cases. Fix any v 2 TAn .
Case 1. Suppose that ak = al for some distinct k; l 2 N . Then the result of Claim 1
holds by Lemma 5.
Case 2. Suppose now that ai 6= aj, for any distinct i; j 2 N , that is, An consists of n
distinct tops. Take i = 1 in Lemma 3 and recall that vm is such that vm1 (a2) = 1 >
1  1=m = vm1 (a1) > vm1 (x) for x 6= a1; a2. Since (vm1 ) = a2 = (v2), we do not have
n distinct tops at (vm1 ; v 1); and it thus comes from Lemma 4 and Lemma 3-(i) that,
for m large enough, '(vm1 ; v 1) = fv 2 fa2; : : : ; ang
. That is to say, fxv = ;, for all
x =2 fa2; : : : ; ang. Moreover, Lemma 3-(ii) tells us that f^xv = fxv for all x 6= a1; a2.
Therefore, we have f^xv =
fxv = ;, for all x =2 fa1; : : : ; ang. That is to say, there exists
(a suciently large) m00 2 IN such that '((v^m001 ; v 1); p) = f^v 2 fa1; : : : ; ang
. It thus
suces to take v00 = (v^m
00
1 ; v 1) to see that Claim 1 is satised.
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Claim 2. For any v; v0 2 TAN , we have '(v; p) = '(v0; p).
To prove Claim 2, let us state two additional preliminaries.
Preliminary 3. Let i 2 N and suppose that (wi; qi); (w0i; qi) 2 D, with (wi) =
(w0i). Then there exist two nite sequences w
1
i ; w
2
i ; : : : ; w
T
i 2 Vq and x1; x2; : : : ; xT 2
X n (wi) such that:7 (a) w1 = w and wT = w0; (b) for all t = 2; : : : ; T , and
wti(x) = w
t 1
i (x) for every x 6= xt and (wi; qi) 2 D.
The proof of Preliminary 3 is easy (and left to the reader). This preliminary
means that we can always nd a path w1i ; : : : ; w
T
i of valuation functions (starting at
wi and leading to w
0
i) such that, for each t = 2; : : : ; T , w
t
i and w
t 1
l disagree on at
most one xt 2 X that is not i's top.
Let us introduce some notation before the next preliminary. Consider distinct
!1; !2 2 
. For any   0, i 2 N and qi; q0i 2 P i, we write q0i = qi  !1 	 !2 if, for
all ! 2 
, we have
q0i(!) =
8<:
qi(!); if ! 6= !1; !2;
qi(!) + ; if ! = !1;
qi(!)  ; if ! = !2:
Preliminary 4. Suppose that (u; q) 2 D. Then there exists q > 0 such that:
(u; q0) 2 D and '(u; q0) = '(u; q) whenever q0 2 PN satises q0 i = q i and q0i =
qi  !1 	 !2 for some i 2 N ,  2 (0; q) and distinct !1; !2 2 
.
Preliminary 4 obtains as the analog of Preliminary 1 when one slightly varies
the belief prole at (u; q). Its proof follows from the fact that the expected utility
operator E
q0i
ui is a continuous function of the belief q
0
i.
We are now ready to prove Claim 2. Using Preliminary 3, it suces to show
that, starting from a prole v 2 TAN , the decision does not change if any single
agent changes her valuation of one non-top outcome. By contradiction, suppose that
h := '(v; p) 6= h0 := '(v0; p) for two proles (v; p); (v0; p) 2 DN such that vk = vl and,
for some i 2 N and a 2 X n(vi), satisfying: (i) v0 i = v i; (ii) v0i(x) = vi(x) if x 6= a;
(iii) v0i(a) > vi(a). In addition,
8 since the set of acts is nite, it is not restrictive to
assume that there exists at most one z 2 (vi(a); v0i(a)) such that (vzi ; pi) =2 D. Note
that, if z indeed exists, this assumption (along with ordinality) implies
'
 
(v i; vz

i ); p

= ' ((v i; vi); p) = h; 8z 2 (vi(a); z) : (26)
Next, remark that misvaluation-proofness of ' requires: (1) Epivzi (h
0)   Epivzi (h) < 0
when z = vi(x); and (2) E
pi
vzi
(h)   Epivzi (h0) > 0 when z = v0i(x). Since E
pi
vzi
is a
continuous function of z, we may use the intermediate value theorem to claim that
7Remark that (b) implies (wti) = (wi) = (w
0
i).
8Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that vzi 2 Vi is dened by vzi (x) =

vi(x); if x 6= a
z; if x = a:
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there exists z 2 (vi(z); v0i(x)) such that Epivzi (h
0)  Epi
vzi
(h) = 0, that is to say,X
!2
0+
pi(!)[v
z
i (h
0(!))  vzi (h(!))] =
X
!2
 
pi(!)[v
z
i (h(!))  vzi (h0(!))]; (27)
where 
0+ := f! 2 
 : vzi (h0(!)) > vzi (h(!))g and 
0  := f! 2 
 : vzi (h0(!)) <
vzi (h(!))g. Note that 
0+ 6= ; and 
0  6= ;. Indeed, we have pi(h0a) > pi(ha) from
Lemma 2 (monotonicity); and hence ; 6= h0a n ha  
0+ [ 
0 . Then, assuming that

0+ 6= ; (or 
0  6= ;), we may use (27) [and pi(!) > 0 for all w 2 
)] to see that

0  6= ; (or 
0+ 6= ;) must also hold.
Next, pick any !1 2 
0+ and !2 2 
0 ; and dene p0i = pi  p2 !1 	 p2 !2, where
p comes from Preliminary 4. Note from (27) that
P
!2
0+
p0i(!)[v
z
i (h
0(!))  vzi (h(!))] >P
!2
 
p0i(!)[v
z
i (h(!))   vzi (h0(!))], that is to say, Ep
0
i
vzi
(h0)   Ep0i
vzi
(h) > 0. Hence, since
E
p0i
vzi
() is a continuous function of z, we can claim that there exists z 2 (vi(a); z) such
that E
p0i
vz

i
(h0)  Ep0i
vz

i
(h) > 0. In other words, i prefers h0 to h at (vz

i ; p
0
i). But this is
a contradiction to misvaluation-proofness. Indeed, observe that (vz

i ; pi) 2 D |since
there exists no z0 2 (vi(a); v0i(a)) n fzg such that (vz0i ; pi) =2 D. Therefore, we have 
(vz

i ; v i); p
 2 DN . It then follows from Preliminary 4 that:  (vzi ; v i); (p0i; p i) 2
DN and '  (vzi ; v i); (p0i; p i) = '  (vzi ; v i); p. Since '  (vzi ; v i); p = h from
(26), it holds that '
 
(vz

i ; v i); (p
0
i; p i)

= h. Moreover, given that ((v0i; v i); p) =
(v0; p) 2 DN , Preliminary 4 once again gives: (v0; (p0i; p i)) 2 DN and ' (v0; (p0i; p i)) =
'(v0; p) = h0. Thus, agent i can protably manipulate ' at ((vz

i ; v i); (p
0
i; p i)) by
misreporting (v0i; p
0
i) in order to get h
0 (which she prefers to h).
Therefore, we must have '(v; p) = '(v0; p) = '(v00; p) 2 fa1; : : : ; ang
 for all
v; v0 2 TAn ; and Lemma 6 is proved.
Lemmas 4 and 6 imply that, if a SCF is strategyproof and ex-post ecient, then at
each preference prole the state space must be partitioned into a collection of events
fEi 2 2
 : i 2 Ng such that agent i dictates the outcome in all states ! 2 Ei. Note
that (i) some Ei may be empty (ii) Ei may vary if we change the beliefs p or the
valuations v |or more precisely, if we change the tops ((v1); : : : ; (vn))). That is to
say, there exist functions  : DN ! (2
)N such that, for all (v; p) 2 DN ,
[i2Ni(v; p) = 
 and '(v; p;!) = (vi) if ! 2 i(v; p): (28)
Remark that there exist many functions  satisfying (28); but for any two of them (say,
0 and 00), we must have:9 0(v; p) = 00(v; p) at any (v; p) 2 DN such that (vi) 6=
(vj) if i 6= j. To conclude the proof of the Top Selection lemma, it just remains to
notice that there is a unique function s(p) = (v; p) that satises (28) and does not
9That is to say, 0(v; p) 6= 00(v; p) may occur only at proles (v; p) where some distinct agents
have the same top.
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vary with v. Since we have shown the tops-only property in Lemmas 4 and 6, we
slightly abuse notation and conveniently write '((a1; : : : ; an); p) to refer to the chosen
act at each (v; p) 2 DN such that ((vi))i2N = (a1; : : : ; an). We then dene s(p) =
(v; p) as follows. For any distinct a1; a2 2 X, let sa1a21 (p) = 'a1((a1; a2; : : : ; a2); p).
Dene sa1a2i (p) in a similar way for all i 6= 1; and write s(p) := sa1a2(p) = (sa1a2i (p))i2N .
We leave it to the reader to check [by using Lemma 3-(ii) and the now established
top-and-tops-only property] that we have: (i) sa1a2(p) = sa3a4(p) = s(p), for all
a1; a2; a3; a4 2 X (a1 6= a2 and a3 6= a4) and all p 2 P ; (ii) '((a1; : : : ; an); p;!) = ai
if ! 2 si(p), for all p 2 PN and (a1; : : : ; an) 2 XN . Observing that s meets the
feasibility constraint [i2Nsi(p) = 
 (for all p 2 PN) then allows to conclude.
9 Appendix B: semi-global results
Let e! 2 
: This state is xed throughout this appendix. It will be convenient to
further simplify notation as follows: we write e
 instead of 
 n e!; eP instead of P(e
);
and ea instead of ae!: For any i 2 eP ; dene
P(i) =
n
pi 2 P : pi j e
  io :
This is the set of beliefs on 
 generating on e
 a likelihood ordering that coincides
with that generated by i:
For any two beliefs pi; qi 2 P ; we write pi  qi if pi; qi are ordinally equivalent,
that is, if R(pi) = R(qi): We abuse this notation and, for any proles p; q 2 PN , we
write p  q if pi  qi for all i 2 N: We write piJqi if pi; qi are adjacent according to
the denition in Section 5. The adjacency relation J is obviously a symmetric binary
relation. If pi; qi 2 P 0  P ; a J-path between pi and qi in P 0 is a nite sequence
pi = (p
t
i)
T
t=1 such that p
1
i = pi, p
T
i = qi; p
t
iJp
t+1
i for t = 1; :::; T   1; and pti 2 P 0 for
t = 1; :::; T: We call P 0 connected if such a J-path exists between any two beliefs in
P 0.
Finally, dene the relation eJ on P(i) by
pi eJqi , pi; qi are fA;Bg -adjacent for some fA;Bg 2 H, e! 2 A; and pi(A) > pi(B):
This is a sub-relation of the adjacency relation J: Contrary to J , the relation eJ is not
symmetric. For an illustration, see Figure 2, where an arrow stands for eJ . Observe
that if two beliefs pi; qi 2 P(i) are fA;Bg-adjacent, then e! 2 A[B : this is because
the likelihood relations generated by pi; qi coincide on e
: Just like J; the relation eJ is
ordinal: if pi eJqi; p0i  pi and q0i  qi; then p0i eJq0i: All its maximal elements in P(i) are
ordinally equivalent; any such maximal element p+i is characterized by the property
that
p+i (e!) > p+i (e
): (29)
Likewise, all the minimal elements of eJ are ordinally equivalent and any such minimal
element p i is characterized by the property that
p i (C [ e!) < p i (D) whenever i(C) < i(D):
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Example 2. If 
 = f1; 2; 3g ; e! = 1; and i is a belief on f2; 3g generating the
ordering f2; 3g ; f2g ; f3g ; then any belief on f1; 2; 3g generating the ordering
f1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1g ; f2; 3g ; f2g ; f3g
is a maximal element p+i of
eJ on P(i); and any belief on f1; 2; 3g generating the
ordering
f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2g ; f2g ; f1; 3g ; f3g ; f1g :
is a minimal element p i of eJ on P(i). See again Figure 2 for an illustration.
A complete eJ-path in P(i); or simply a complete path, is a nite sequence pi =
(pti)
T
t=1 such that p
1
i is a maximal element of eJ (in P(i)), pTi is a minimal element,
pti eJpt+1i for t = 1; :::; T   1, and pti 2 P(i) for t = 1; :::; T:
Observation 1. For each complete eJ-path pi = (pti)Tt=1 in P(i); T =j ffA;Bg 2 H
: e! 2 A [Bg j :
This is because any maximal and minimal elements p+i ; p
 
i lie (i) on opposite sides
of every hyperplane pi(A) = pi(B) such that e! 2 A [B; and (ii) on the same side of
every hyperplane pi(A) = pi(B) such that e! =2 A [B:
Observation 2. For each complete eJ-path pi in P(i) and each t 2 f1; :::; T   1g ;
there is a unique fAt; Btg 2 H such that pti;pt+1i are fAt; Btg-adjacent. Moreover,
fAt; Btg 6= At0 ; Bt0	 if t 6= t0:
Observation 3. Each belief pi 2 P(i) lies on some complete eJ-path in P(i) :
there exist pi and t 2 f1; :::; Tg such that pi = pti:
The proofs of observations 2 and 3 are straightforward and left to the reader.
Lemma 7. For all i 2 N; i 2 eP ; and p i 2 PNni, either (a) si(:; p i) is constant
on P(i); or (b) there exist disjoint sets Ai(i; p i); Bi(i; p i); Ci(i; p i)  
 such
that e! 2 Ai(i; p i); i(Ai(i; p i) n e!) < i(Bi(i; p i)); and for all pi 2 P(i);
si(pi; p i) =
(
Ai(i; p i) [ Ci(i; p i) if pi(Ai(i; p i)) > pi(Bi(i; p i));
Bi(i; p i) [ Ci(i; p i) otherwise.
The inequality i(Ai(i; p i) n e!) < i(Bi(i; p i)) implies that the function si(:; p i)
in statement (b) is not constant: the assignment actually varies with agent i's beliefs.
Proof. Let i 2 N; i 2 eP ; p i 2 PNni. Since i; p i are xed throughout the proof,
we omit them from our notation. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the
sets whose existence is asserted in Lemma 7 may depend on our choice of i; p i. Let
T = jffA;Bg 2 H : e! 2 A [Bgj :
Step 1. We claim that for any complete eJ-path pi = (pti)Tt=1 in P(i); one of the
following statements hold:
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() si(p
1
i ) = si(p
2
i ) = ::: = si(p
T
i );
() there exist disjoint setsAi(pi); Bi(pi); Ci(pi)  
 such that e! 2 Ai(pi); i(Ai(pi)ne!) < i(Bi(pi)); and there exists t(pi) 2 f1; :::; T   1g such that
si(p
t
i) =
(
Ai(pi) [ Ci(pi) if t  t(pi);
Bi(pi) [ Ci(pi) if t > t(pi):
(30)
To prove this claim, x a complete eJ-path pi in P(i): For each t = 1; :::; T   1;
let fAt; Btg be the unique pair in H such that pti;pt+1i are fAt; Btg-adjacent. By
denition of eJ; e! 2 At and pti(At) > pti(Bt): By the Local Bilaterality lemma, one of
the following statements holds:
(i) si(p
t
i) = si(p
t+1
i );
(ii) si(p
t
i) n si(pt+1i ) = At and si(pt+1i ) n si(pti) = Bt:
If (i) holds for t = 1; :::; T   1; then statement () is true. Otherwise, let t be the
smallest t 2 f1; :::; T   1g such that si(pti) 6= si(pt+1i ): By (ii), si(pti )nsi(pt
+1
i ) = A
t :
Since e! 2 At ; we have e! =2 si(pt+1i ): This means that statement (ii) cannot hold
for any t = t + 1; :::; T . Hence, si(pti) = si(p
t+1
i ) for t = t
 + 1; :::; T: Dening
Ai(pi) = A
t ; Bi(pi) = B
t ; Ci(pi) = si(p
1
i ) n At ; we obtain (30).
Step 2. Let p+i and p
 
i be maximal and minimal elements of
eJ in P(i):
If si(p
+
i ) = si(p
 
i ); dene Ci = si(p
+
i ) = si(p
 
i ): For any pi 2 P(i) there exists
some path pi and some t 2 f1; :::; Tg such that pi = pti (Observation 3). By Step 1,
si(pi) = si(p
t
i) = Ci; that is, statement (a) in Lemma 7 holds.
If si(p
+
i ) 6= si(p i ); we know from Step 2 that statement () holds for every com-
plete eJ-path pi = (pti)Tt=1 in P(i): We claim that the sets Ai(pi); Bi(pi); Ci(pi) do
not change with pi: To see why, let pi;qi be two paths. If Ai(pi) 6= Ai(qi) or Ci(pi) 6=
Ci(qi); then si(p
+
i ) = si(p
1
i ) = Ai(pi) [Ci(pi) 6= Ai(qi) [Ci(qi) = si(q1i ) = si(p+i ); a
contradiction. Thus Ai(pi) = Ai(qi) and Ci(pi) = Ci(qi): Next, if Bi(pi) 6= Bi(qi);
then si(p
 
i ) = si(p
T
i ) = Bi(pi)[Ci(pi) = Bi(pi)[Ci(qi) 6= Bi(qi)[Ci(qi) = si(qTi ) =
si(p
 
i ); again a contradiction.
Let Ai; Bi; Ci be the sets such that Ai(pi) = Ai; Bi(pi) = Bi; and Ci(pi) = Ci for
all complete eJ-paths pi in P(i): For any pi 2 P(i) there exist some path pi and
some t 2 f1; :::; Tg such that pi = pti; and, by Step 1, an integer t(pi) 2 f1; :::; T   1g
such that
si(p
t
i) =
(
Ai [ Ci if t  t(pi);
Bi [ Ci if t > t(pi):
(31)
This integer may {and typically does{ change with the path pi, as Figure 2 illustrates.
If pi(Ai) = p
t
i(Ai) > p
t
i(Bi) = pi(Bi); then t  t(pi) : otherwise (31) would
imply si(pi) = Bi [ Ci; hence pi(si(p1i )) = pi(Ai [ Ci) > pi(Bi [ Ci) = pi(si(pi));
contradicting strategyproofness. Since t  t(pi); (31) implies si(pi) = Ai [ Ci:
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Likewise, if pi(Ai) < pi(Bi); then t > t
(pi) and (31) imply si(pi) = Bi [ Ci: We
conclude that statement (b) in Lemma 7 holds with Ai(i; p i) = Ai; Bi(i; p i) = Bi;
and Ci(i; p i) = Ci: 
We record below two immediate consequences of Lemma 7 that will be used later.
Corollary 1. For all i 2 N; i 2 eP ; pi; p0i 2 P(i); and p i 2 PNni,
(a) e! 2 si(pi; p i) \ si(p0i; p i)) si(pi; p i) = si(p0i; p i);
(b) e! =2 si(pi; p i) [ si(p0i; p i)) si(pi; p i) = si(p0i; p i):
Given the other agents' beliefs, i's assignment is fully determined by whether it con-
tains e! or not.
Corollary 2. For all i 2 N; i 2 eP ; p i 2 PNni, and any maximal and mini-
mal elements p+i ; p
 
i of
eJ in P(i); if s(:; p i) is not constant on P(i); then e! 2
si(p
+
i ; p i) n si(p i ; p i):
We now show that the sets Ai(i; p i); Bi(i; p i); Ci(i; p i) in Lemma 7 do
not vary with p i as long as the ordering generated on eP by each pj; j 2 N n i;
remains unchanged. If  2 ePN and i 2 N; we write PN() = k2NP(k) and
PNni( i) = k 6=iP(k):
Lemma 8. For all i 2 N and  2 ePN ; there exist disjoint sets Ai(); Bi(); Ci() 

 such that e! 2 Ai(); i(Ai()n e!) < i(Bi()); and, for all p i 2 PNni( i); either
(a) si(:; p i) is constant on P(i); or (b) for all pi 2 P(i);
si(pi; p i) =
(
Ai() [ Ci() if pi(Ai()) > pi(Bi());
Bi() [ Ci() otherwise.
We emphasize that Lemma 8 does not assert that si(pi; :) is constant over PNni( i):
Proof. Let i 2 N and let  2 ePN : Dene the set
PNni ( i) =

p i 2 PNni( i) : si(:; p i) is not constant on P(i)
	
: (32)
Let p i; q i 2 PNni ( i): By Lemma 7 {and dropping i from the notation{ there exist
disjoint sets Ai(p i); Bi(p i); Ci(p i)  
 such that e! 2 Ai(p i); i(Ai(p i) n e!) <
i(Bi(p i)); and
for all pi 2 P(i); si(pi; p i) =
(
Ai(p i) [ Ci(p i) if pi(Ai(p i)) > pi(Bi(p i));
Bi(p i) [ Ci(p i) otherwise,
(33)
and there exist disjoint sets Ai(q i); Bi(q i); Ci(q i)  
 such that e! 2 Ai(q i);
i(Ai(q i) n e!) < i(Bi(q i)); and
for all pi 2 P(i); si(pi; q i) =
(
Ai(q i) [ Ci(q i) if pi(Ai(q i)) > pi(Bi(q i));
Bi(q i) [ Ci(q i) otherwise.
(34)
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We must prove that Ai(p i) = Ai(q i); Bi(p i) = Bi(q i); and Ci(p i) = Ci(q i):
There is obviously no loss of generality in assuming that there exists some j 6= i
such that pk = qk for all k 2 N n fi; jg : We therefore drop the beliefs of the agents
other than i; j from our notation. Moreover, since P(j) is connected, there is no loss
in assuming that pj; qj are adjacent.
Let p+i ; p
 
i be maximal and minimal elements of
eJ in P(i). By Corollary 2,
e! 2 si(p+i ; pj) n si(p i ; pj);e! 2 si(p+i ; qj) n si(p i ; qj):
Since e! =2 sj(p+i ; pj) [ sj(p+i ; qj); Corollary 1 implies sj(p+i ; pj) = sj(p+i ; qj): By non-
bossiness, si(p
+
i ; pj) = si(p
+
i ; qj): Since e! 2 si(p+i ; pj) \ si(p+i ; qj); it follows from (34)
that
Ai(pj) [ Ci(pj) = Ai(qj) [ Ci(qj):
Next, we claim that either e! 2 sj(p i ; pj)\ sj(p i ; qj) or e! =2 sj(p i ; pj)[ sj(p i ; qj):
Suppose, on the contrary, that, say, e! 2 sj(p i ; pj) n sj(p i ; qj): Since e! =2 si(p i ; qj);
there exists k 2 Nnfi; jg such that e! 2 sk(p i ; qj)nsk(p i ; pj): By the Local Bilaterality
lemma, si(p
 
i ; qj) = si(p
 
i ; pj); that is,
Bi(pj) [ Ci(pj) = Bi(qj) [ Ci(qj):
Since Ai(pj); Bi(pj); Ci(pj) are disjoint and Ai(qj); Bi(qj); Ci(qj) are disjoint, these
equalities imply Ai(pj) = Ai(qj); Bi(pj) = Bi(qj); and Ci(pj) = Ci(qj): 
We are now ready to describe the structure of s on any sub-domain PN().
Terminology. Given  2 ePN ; we say that s varies only with agent i's beliefs (on
PN()) if there exists p i 2 PNni( i) such that s(:; p i) is not constant on P(i) but
s(:; p j) is constant on P(j) for every j 6= i and every p j 2 PNnj( j): We say that
s varies with the beliefs of agents i and j (on PN()) if there exist p i 2 PNni( i)
such that s(:; p i) is not constant on P(i) and there exists p j 2 PNnj( j) such
that s(:; p j) is not constant on P(j): We emphasize that this denition allows s to
potentially vary with the beliefs of agents other than i; j as well.
We say that fA;Bg 2 H cuts P(i) if there exist pi; qi 2 P(i) such that (pi(A) 
pi(B))(qi(A)  qi(B)) < 0: Observe that if e! 2 A, then fA;Bg cuts P(i) if and only
if i(A n e!) < i(B):
Lemma 9. For every  2 ePN there exists a partition fA(); B(); C1(); :::; Cn()g
of 
 such that e! 2 A() [B() and
(a) if s varies only with agent 1's beliefs on PN(); then fA;Bg cuts P(1) and
there exists an agent i 2 N n 1; say agent 2; such that for all p 2 PN();
s(p) =
(
(A() [ C1(); B() [ C2(); C3(); :::; Cn()) if p1(A()) > p1(B());
(B() [ C1(); A() [ C2(); C3(); :::; Cn())) otherwise,
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(b) if s varies with the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 on PN(); then fA;Bg cuts
P(1);P(2) and for all p 2 PN();
s(p) =
8><>:
(A() [ C1(); B() [ C2(); C3(); :::; Cn()) if p1(A()) > p1(B())
and p2(A()) < p2(B());
(B() [ C1(); A() [ C2(); C3(); :::; Cn()) otherwise.
Remark 1. (a) We stated Lemma 9 with reference to agents 1 and 2 for notational
convenience but of course the result holds, up to a relabeling, for any pair of agents.
(b) Statement (b) does not assume that the assignment is independent of the be-
liefs of agents 3; :::; n: Rather, it is a corollary to Lemma 9 that, on PN(), (i) the
assignment may vary with the beliefs of at most two agents and (ii) only the events
assigned to two agents may change.
Proof. Let  2 ePN : This prole is xed throughout the proof and dropped from the
notation whenever this causes no confusion.
Step 1. Suppose rst that s varies only with agent 1's beliefs.
Recall the denition of PNn1 ( 1) in (32). By Lemma 8, there exist disjoint sets
A1; B1; C1 such that for all p1 2 P(1) and all p 1 2 PNn1 ( 1),
s1(p1; p 1) =
(
A1 [ C1 if p1(A1) > p1(B1);
B1 [ C1 otherwise.
Moreover, e! 2 A1 and 1(A1 n e!) < 1(B1()); implying that fA1; B1g cuts P(1):
Since s does not vary with the beliefs of agents 2; :::; n, the above expression
must, in fact, hold for all (p1; p 1) 2 PN(): Statement (a) now follows from the
Local Bilaterality lemma and non-bossiness.
Step 2. Suppose next that s varies with the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 on PN():
Since P(1), P(2) are connected, there are adjacent beliefs p1; p01 2 P(1); adja-
cent beliefs p2; p
0
2 2 P(2); and sub-proles p 1 2 PNn1( 1); q 2 2 PNn2( 2) such
that
s(p1; p 1) =  6= 0 = s(p01; p 1); (35)
s(q2; q 2) =  6= 0 = s(q02; q 2): (36)
Sub-step 2.1. We show that the assignment varies locally with two agents' beliefs:
there exist two agents i; j 2 N; two adjacent beliefs pi; p0i 2 P(i); two adjacent
beliefs pj; p
0
j 2 P(j); and a sub-prole p ij 2 PNnij( ij) such that s(p0i; pj; p ij) 6=
s(pi; pj; p ij) 6= s(pi; p0j; p ij):
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Suppose not. Then (35) implies
s(p1; p
0
j; p 1j) =  6= 0 = s(p01; p0j; p 1j)
for all j 6= 1 and all p0j adjacent to pj: Since P(j) is connected, it follows that
s(p1; p
0
 1) =  6= 0 = s(p01; p0 1) (37)
for all p0 1 2 PNn1( 1):
By the same token, (36) implies
s(q2; q
0
 2) =  6= 0 = s(q02; q0 2) (38)
for all q0 2 2 PNn2( 2):
Statement (37) implies s(p1; q2; p 12) = s(p1; q02; p 12) and statement (38) implies
s(p1; q2; p 12) 6= s(p1; q02; p 12); a contradiction.
Sub-step 2.2. We show that there exist disjoint sets A;B;C1; :::; Cn such that
A;B 6= ;; e! 2 A [B; and, for all k 6= i; j;
(si; sj; sk)(pi; pj; p ij) = (A [ Ci; B [ Cj; Ck);
(si; sj; sk)(p
0
i; pj; p ij) = (si; sj; sk)(p
0
i; pj; p ij) = (B [ Ci; A [ Cj; Ck):
(39)
Since p ij is xed, let us drop it from the notation. By Sub-step 2.1 and Lemma
8, there exist disjoint sets Ai; Bi; Ci and disjoint sets Aj; Bj; Cj such that e! 2 Ai\Aj;
Bi; Bj 6= ;; and
[si(pi; pj) = Ai [ Ci; si(p0i; pj) = Bi [ Ci] or [si(pi; pj) = Bi [ Ci; si(p0i; pj) = Ai [ Ci]
and
sj(pi; pj) = Aj [ Cj; sj(pi; p0j) = Bj [ Cj

or

sj(pi; pj) = Bj [ Cj; sj(pi; p0j) = Aj [ Cj

:
Since e! 2 Ai\Aj and si(pi; pj)\ sj(pi; pj) = ;; we need only consider three cases.
Case 1. (i) si(pi; pj) = Ai [Ci; (ii) si(p0i; pj) = Bi [Ci; (iii) sj(pi; pj) = Bj [Cj; (iv)
sj(pi; p
0
j) = Aj [ Cj.
Dene A = Ai; B = Bj; Ck = sk(pi; pj) for k 6= i; j: By the Local Bilaterality
lemma, (i), (iii), and (iv) imply Aj = A; Bi = B; si(pi; p
0
j) = B [Ci; and sk(pi; p0j) =
Ck for k 6= i; j:
Next, since si(pi; pj) = A [ Ci; si(p0i; pj) = B [ Ci; and sj(pi; pj) = B [ Cj; the
Local Bilaterality lemma implies sj(p
0
i; pj) = A [ Cj and sk(p0i; pj) = Ck for k 6= i; j,
establishing (39).
Case 2. (i) si(pi; pj) = Bi [Ci; (ii) si(p0i; pj) = Ai [Ci; (iii) sj(pi; pj) = Aj [Cj; (iv)
sj(pi; p
0
j) = Bj [ Cj.
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Dene A = Bi; B = Aj; Ck = sk(pi; pj) for k 6= i; j: Statement (39) follows by the
same argument as in Case 1, mutatis mutandis.
Case 3. (i) si(pi; pj) = Bi [Ci; (ii) si(p0i; pj) = Ai [Ci; (iii) sj(pi; pj) = Bj [Cj; (iv)
sj(pi; p
0
j) = Aj [ Cj.
This case is impossible. To see why, note rst that (i), (ii), (iii), and the Local
Bilaterality lemma imply sj(p
0
i; pj) = Bj [ Cj whereas (i), (iii), (iv) and the Local
Bilaterality lemma imply si(pi; p
0
j) = Bi [ Ci:
Since (si; sj)(p
0
i; pj) = (Ai [ Ci; Bj [ Cj) and (si; sj)(pi; p0j) = (Bi [ Ci; Aj [ Cj),
Lemma 3 implies that one of the following statements holds:
(si; sj)(p
0
i; p
0
j) = (Ai [ Ci; Bj [ Cj);
(si; sj)(p
0
i; p
0
j) = (Bi [ Ci; Aj [ Cj):
In either case, the Local Bilaterality lemma requires Ai = Aj and Bi = Bj: The latter
equality implies that si(pi; pj) \ sj(pi; pj) 6= ;, violating feasibility.
Sub-step 2.3. Assume from now on that e! belongs to the set A in (39). The case
where e! belongs to B is identical up to a permutation of agents i and j: We show
that for all (qi; qj) 2 P(i) P(j) and all k 6= i; j;
(si; sj; sk)(qi; qj; p ij) =
(
(A [ Ci; B [ Cj; Ck) if qi(A) > qi(B) and qj(A) < qj(B);
(B [ Ci; A [ Cj; Ck) otherwise.
(40)
Since p ij is xed, let us drop it again from the notation. By Sub-step 2.2 and
Lemma 8, pi(A) > pi(B) and pj(A) < pj(B); and it follows that (40) holds for the
case where qi = pi or qj = pj:
Next, for any qi such that qi(A) < qi(B); the fact that sj(qi; pj) = A [ Cj implies
that sj(qi; :) is constant, hence, by non-bossiness, (si; sj; sk)(qi; qj) = (B [Ci; A[Cj;
Ck):
Similarly, for any qj such that qj(A) > qj(B); the fact that si(pi; qj) = B [ Ci
implies that si(:; qj) is constant, hence, by non-bossiness, (si; sj; sk)(qi; qj) = (B [Ci;
A [ Cj; Ck):
Finally, for any (qi; qj) such that qi(A) > qi(B) and qj(A) < qj(B); the fact that
si(:; qj) and sj(:; qi) are not constant, together with non-bossiness, implies (si; sj; sk)
(qi; qj) = (A [ Ci; B [ Cj; Ck); completing the proof of (40).
Sub-step 2.4. We show that for all q 2 PN() and all k 6= i; j;
(si; sj; sk)(q) =
(
(A [ Ci; B [ Cj; Ck) if qi(A) > qi(B) and qj(A) < qj(B);
(B [ Ci; A [ Cj; Ck) otherwise.
(41)
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Let q 2 PN(): Given Sub-step 2.3 and because each P(k) is connected, we
may assume without loss of generality that there exists some k 6= i; j such that qk is
adjacent to pk and qk0 = pk0 for all k
0 6= i; j; k: In what follows, we drop q ijk = p ijk
from our notation. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that s(qi; qj; qk) 6= s(qi; qj; pk).
If (si; sj; sk)(qi; qj; pk) = (A[Ci; B[Cj; Ck); non-bossiness implies sk(qi; qj; qk) 6=
sk(qi; qj; pk). Since pk; qk 2 P(k), the pair of events fE;E 0g for which pk; qk are
fE;E 0g-adjacent is such that e! 2 E [ E 0: Since e! 2 A [ Ci = si(qi; qj; pk); we must
therefore have si(qi; qj; qk) 6= si(qi; qj; pk) and Lemma 8 implies si(qi; qj; qk) = B [Ci:
By the Local Bilaterality lemma, sj(qi; qj; qk) = si(qi; qj; pk) = B [ Cj: This means
that si(qi; qj; qk) \ sj(qi; qj; qk) 6= ;, contradicting feasibility.
If (si; sj; sk)(qi; qj; pk) = (B [ Ci; A [ Cj; Ck); exchanging the roles of i and j in
the above argument yields the same contradiction.
Sub-step 2.5. Since s varies with the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 on PN(); (41) must
hold with fi; jg = f1; 2g, completing the proof of statement (b). 
Terminology. Given  2 ePN ; a rule s of the type identied in part (a) of Lemma 9
is called (1; 2)-dictatorial (with respect to fA(); B()g) on PN() : the assignment
varies only with agent 1's beliefs and only the events allocated to agents 1 and 2
change. For such a rule, there is no loss of generality in assuming that e! 2 A(): we
maintain that convention throughout.
A rule of the type identied in part (b) is called f1; 2g-consensual (with respect
to fA(); B()g) on PN(). We call it (1; 2)-consensual if e! 2 B() and (2; 1)-
consensual if e! 2 A(): under an (i; j)-consensual rule, the \default option" assigns
state e! to agent i.
We call the sets C1(); :::; Cn() residuals.
10 Appendix C: proof of the Bilateral Consensus
lemma
10.1 Contagion results
As in Appendix B, e! 2 
 remains xed throughout this sub-section, and we keep
the notation e
 = 
 n e! and eP = P(e
): For any xed belief prole  2 eP , Lemma 9
describes the structure of s on the sub-domain PN(). We will now describe how this
structure varies with :We begin with two \contagion lemmas" and an \independence
lemma", which link the behavior of s across \adjacent" sub-domains. These lemmas
require extending the notion of adjacency to beliefs dened over an arbitrary subset of

: For any 
0  
 (e.g., 
0 = e
), letH(
0) = ffA;Bg : ; 6= A;B  
0 and A\B = ;g
and say that i; i 2 P(
0) are fA;Bg-adjacent if (i(A) i(B))(i(A) i(B)) < 0
and (i(C)   i(D)) (i(C)   i(D)) > 0 for all fC;Dg 2 H(
0) n ffA;Bgg : With
a slight abuse of notation, we use J to denote the adjacency relation between beliefs
on any 
0: Connectedness of a subset of P(
0) is dened in the obvious way.
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First, an intermediate result.
Lemma 10. Let  2 ePN ; let 1; 2 2 eP be adjacent to 1; 2; respectively, and let s
be (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn:
(a) If s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to some fA0; B0g on PN(2;  2), then
fA0; B0g cuts P(2) and fA;Bg cuts P(2):
(b) If s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to some fA0; B0g on PN(1;  1), then
fA0; B0g cuts P(1) and fA;Bg cuts P(1):
Remark 2. We stated Lemma 10 for the ordered pair (2; 1) for notational simplicity
only: up to a relabeling, the result applies to any ordered pair (i; j) of agents. This
comment applies also to the results below.
Proof. We only prove statement (a). Although statement (b) is not a mere permuta-
tion of statement (a) (because s is (2; 1)-consensual in both cases), its proof is almost
identical and therefore omitted. Fix  2 ePN and 2 2 eP adjacent to 2. Suppose
s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn; and
(2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA0; B0g on PN(2;  2) with residuals C 01; :::; C 0n:
Fix an arbitrary sub-prole p 12 2 PNn12( 12) and drop it from the notation. Then,
for all p = (p1; p2) 2 P(1) P(2);
(s1; s2)(p1; p2) =
(
(A [ C1; B [ C2) if p1(A) > p1(B) and p2(A) < p2(B);
(B [ C1; A [ C2) otherwise,
(42)
and for all (p1; q2) 2 P(1) P(2);
(s1; s2)(p1; q2) =
(
(A0 [ C 01; B0 [ C 02) if p1(A0) > p1(B0) and q2(A0) < q2(B0);
(B0 [ C 01; A0 [ C 02) otherwise,
(43)
where e! 2 A \ A0; fA;Bg cuts P(1);P(2); and fA0; B0g cuts P(1);P(2): In
particular, writing eA := A n e!; eA0 := A0 n e!; we have
2( eA) < 2(B): (44)
2( eA0) < 2(B0): (45)
Let p+1 ; p
+
2 ; q
+
2 and p
 
1 ; p
 
2 ; q
 
2 be, respectively, maximal and minimal elements ofeJ in, respectively, P(1);P(2); and P(2): Let fE;E 0g 2 H(e
) be the unique pair
of disjoint subsets of e
 such that 2 and 2 are fE;E 0g-adjacent with, say, 2(E) >
2(E
0). Recall that 2; 2 are beliefs on e
 = 
 n e!; this implies that e! =2 E [ E 0:
Observe now that p+2 ; q
+
2 are fE;E 0g-adjacent beliefs on 
: this follows directly from
the characteristic inequality (29). In contrast, p 2 ; q
 
2 need not be adjacent, as Figure
2 illustrates.
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We will only prove that fA0; B0g cuts P(2); the proof that fA;Bg cuts P(2) is
the same, mutatis mutandis. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
2( eA0) > 2(B0): (46)
We rst claim that for every b! 2 E [ E 0;
p 2 j b
  q 2 j b
; (47)
where b
 := 
 n b!: To see why, x disjoint events C;D  b
 and observe that
p 2 (C) < p
 
2 (D) , 2(C n e!) < 2(D n e!)
, 2(C n e!) < 2(D n e!)
, q 2 (C) < q 2 (D):
The rst equivalence holds by denition of p 2 . The second holds because b! 2 E [E 0
and b! =2 C [ D imply that fC n e!;D n e!g diers from fE;E 0g ; the unique pair of
disjoints subsets of e
 on which the likelihood orderings generated by 2; 2 disagree.
The third equivalence holds by denition of q 2 :
Next, let b2 be a belief on b
 such that p 2 j b
  q 2 j b
  b2: We emphasize that
the belief b2 is not dened on the same event as 2; 2; which are beliefs on e
: Dene
P(b2) = np2 2 P : p2 j b
  b2o : For every  2 [0; 1] ; dene
q2 = p
 
2 + (1  )q 2 :
Observe that q2 2 P(b2)\ (P(2)[P(2))) for every  2 [0; 1] ; where the upperbar
denotes the closure operator. Furthermore, because we assumed that fA0; B0g does
not cut P(2) (i.e., (46) holds), there exists some  2 [0; 1] such that
q2 2 P(2) and q2(A0) > q2(B0): (48)
We omit the easy proof for brevity.
Pick p1 2 P(1) such p1(A) > p1(B) and p1(A0) > p1(B0): By denition of q 2 and
thanks to (45), q 2 (A
0) < q 2 (B
0); hence from (43),
s2(p1;
0 q2) = s2(p1; q
 
2 ) = B
0 [ C 02: (49)
Choosing  such that (48) holds, (43) again implies
s2(p1;
 q2) = A
0 [ C 02: (50)
But since q2 2 P(b2) for all  2 [0; 1] ; (49), (50), and Lemma 8, applied with b

instead of e
; imply
s2(p1;
1 q2) = s2(p1; p
 
2 ) = A
0 [ C 02:
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However, by denition of p 2 and thanks to (44), p
 
2 (A) < p
 
2 (B); hence from (42),
s2(p1; p
 
2 ) = B [ C2;
contradicting the previous equality since e! 2 (A0 [ C 02) n (B [ C2): 
First Contagion Lemma. Let  2 ePN ; let 2 2 eP be adjacent to 2; and let s be
(2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn:
(a) If fA;Bg cuts P(2); then s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN(2;  2):
(b) If fA;Bg does not cut P(2); then s(p) = (B [ C1; A [ C2; C3; :::; Cn) for all
p 2 PN(2;  2):
Remark 3. Statement (a) does not assert that the residuals C 01; :::; C
0
n associated with
the (2; 1)-consensual rule s on PN(2;  2) coincide with the residuals C1; ::::; Cn on
PN() : in fact, they generally do not.
Statement (b), on the other hand, asserts that s is constant on PN(2;  2) and the
residuals are the same as on PN(): the assignment outside A[B remains constant
when 2's beliefs switch from P(2) to P(2). It may be worth explaining why a C-BD-
BC union indeed possesses this property. The reason is the following. Since we have
assumed that s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(); we know that
fA;Bg cuts P(2); that is, 2( eA) < 2(B): On the other hand, since fA;Bg does not
cut P(2); we have 2( eA) > 2(B): It follows that the adjacent beliefs 2; 2 must,
in fact, be f eA;Bg-adjacent. This means that any two beliefs p2 2 P(2); q2 2 P(2)
agree on the ranking of all events C;D  
 n (A [ B): As a result, the assignment
outside A [B remains unchanged under a C-BD-BC union.
Proof. Fix  2 ePN ; 2 2 eP such that 2; 2 are adjacent. Suppose s is (2; 1)-
consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn : (42) holds for
all p 2 PN(); e! 2 A; and fA;Bg cuts P(2); i.e., (44) holds. For any k 2 N; let
p+k ; p
 
k denote maximal and minimal elements of
eJ in P(k); q+2 ; q 2 be maximal and
minimal elements of eJ in P(2); and let E;E 0 be the disjoint subsets of e
 such that
2 and 2 are fE;E 0g-adjacent with 2(E) > 2(E 0). Recall that e! =2 E [ E 0:
Step 1. We show that for every agent k 6= 2 and every k0 6= k; s is neither (k; k0)-
dictatorial nor (k; k0)-consensual on PN(2;  2):
Fix k 6= 2; k0 6= k: Fix a sub-prole p 2k 2 PNn2k( 2k) and drop it from the
notation. Since s is (2; 1)-consensual on PN(); we have e! 2 s2(p+2 ; p+k ): If s is
(k; k0)-dictatorial or (k; k0)-consensual on PN(2;  2), then e! 2 sk(q+2 ; p+k ): These
two statements contradict the Local Bilaterality lemma because p+2 ; q
+
2 are fE;E 0g-
adjacent and e! =2 E [ E 0:
Step 2. We prove statement (a).
Suppose fA;Bg cuts P(2); that is,
2( eA) < 2(B): (51)
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Sub-step 2.1. We show that s varies with the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 on PN(2;  2):
Fix a sub-prole p 12 2 PNn12( 12) and drop it from the notation. Because
fA;Bg cuts P(2); there exist adjacent beliefs p2 2 P(2) and q2 2 P(2) such that
p2(A) < p2(B): These beliefs are, in fact, fE;E 0g-adjacent.
Choose p1 2 P(1) such that p1(A) > p1(B): From (42), s2(p1; p+2 ) = A [ C2 and
s2(p1; p2) = B [ C2: By the Local Bilaterality lemma,
s2(p1; q
+
2 ) = A [ C2 or (A [ C2 [ E 0) n E;
s2(p1; q2) = B [ C2 or (B [ C2 [ E 0) n E:
It follows that e! 2 s2(p1; q+2 ) n s2(p1; q2): s varies with agent 2's beliefs.
Next, choose q1 2 P(1) such that q1(A) < q1(B): From (42), s2(q1; p2) = A[C2:
By the Local Bilaterality lemma,
s2(q1; q2) = A [ C2 or (A [ C2 [ E 0) n E:
Thus e! 2 s2(q1; q2) n s2(p1; q2): s varies with agent 1's beliefs.
Sub-step 2.2. Since s varies with the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 on PN(2;  2);
Lemma 9 and Step 1 imply that s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to some fA0; B0g on
PN(2;  2) with, say, residuals C 01; :::; C 02: Thus, (43) holds for all (p1; q2) 2 P(1)
P(2), e! 2 A0; and fA0; B0g cuts P(1);P(2): In particular, (45) holds. To complete
the proof of statement (a), it remains to prove that fA;Bg = fA0; B0g :
Suppose, contrary to our claim, that fA;Bg 6= fA0; B0g. Dene the positive
numbers
 = 1(B)  1( eA);
0 = 1(B0)  1( eA0):
Assume  6= 0: This is without loss of generality: if  = 0; simply replace 1 with
an ordinally equivalent belief for which the two corresponding numbers dier. Either
 < 0 or 0 < : We will only treat the former case; the latter is identical, mutatis
mutandis.
For each  2 [0; 1] ; dene p1 2 P(1) by
p1 (e!) =  and p1 (!) = (1  )1(!) for all ! 2 e
:
Elementary algebra shows that p1 (A) < p

1 (B) ,  < 1+ and p1 (A0) < p1 (B0) ,
 < 
0
1+0 : Since  < 
0; we have 
1+
< 
0
1+0 : Choosing

1+
<  < 
0
1+0 ; we have
p1 (A) > p

1 (B) and p

1 (A
0) < p1 (B
0): (52)
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Because of (44) and (51), there exist adjacent beliefs p2 2 P(2) and q2 2 P(2)
such that p2(A) < p2(B): This is illustrated in Figure 3 with A = f1g ; B = f2g; we
omit the easy proof for brevity. From this inequality, (42), and the rst inequality in
(52), we obtain
s2 (p

1 ; p2) = B [ C2:
From (43) and the second inequality in (52),
s2 (p

1 ; q2) = A
0 [ C 02:
It follows that e! 2 s2 (p1 ; q2) n s2 (p1 ; p2) ; contradicting the Local Bilaterality lemma
because p2; q2 are fE;E 0g-adjacent and e! =2 E [ E 0.
Step 3. We prove statement (b).
Suppose fA;Bg does not cut P(2), that is,
2( eA) > 2(B): (53)
Sub-step 3.1. We prove that s is neither (2; k)-dictatorial nor (2; k)-consensual on
PN(2;  2) for any k 6= 2 :
Suppose it is.
Case 1: fA0; B0g cuts P(2); that is, 2( eA0) < 2(B0):
Fix a sub-prole p 2k 2 PNn2k( 2k) and drop it from the notation. Because of
(53), there exist adjacent p2 2 P(2) and q2 2 P(2) such that p2(A) > p2(B) and
q2(A
0) < q2(B0).
Choose pk 2 P(k) such that pk(A0) > pk(B0): From (42), e! 2 s2(p2; pk): But since
s is (2; k)-dictatorial or (2; k)-consensual on PN(2;  2), e! 2 sk(q2; pk); contradicting
the Local Bilaterality lemma.
Case 2: fA0; B0g does not cut P(2); that is, 2( eA0) > 2(B0).
Fix a sub-prole p 2 2 PNn2( 2) such that p1(A) > p1(B) and pk(A0) > pk(B0)
(where 1 and k may coincide). Drop this sub-prole from the notation.
We derive a contradiction using a variant of the argument in Lemma 10. Fixb! 2 E[E 0: As we proved in Lemma 10, there exists a belief b2 on 
nb! such that p 2 j b

 q 2 j b
  b2 and there exists  2 [0; 1] such that q2 := p 2 + (1   )q 2 2 P(2)
and q2(A
0) > q2(B0).
Since q 2 (A
0) < q 2 (B
0) and s is (2; k)-dictatorial or (2; k)-consensual on PN(2;  2),
s2(
0q2) = s2(q
 
2 ) = B
0 [ C 02;
s2(
q2) = A
0 [ C 02:
Since q2 2 P(b2) for all  2 [0; 1] ; these equalities and Lemma 8 imply
s2(
1q2) = s2(p
 
2 ) = A
0 [ C 02:
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But (42) implies s2(p
 
2 ) = B [ C2; a contradiction.
Sub-step 3.2. Step 1, Sub-step 3.1, and Lemma 9 together imply that s is constant
on PN(2;  2). To complete the proof of statement (b), we need to show that the
constant assignment prescribed by s is (B [ C1; A [ C2; C3; :::; Cn):
Fix again b! 2 E [ E 0 and b2  p 2 j b
  q 2 j b
. Because fA;Bg does not cut
P(2); there exists  2 [0; 1] such that q2 := p 2 +(1 )q 2 2 P(2) and q2(A) >
q2(B): Pick p1 2 P(1) such p1(A) > p1(B): Fix p 12 and drop it from the notation.
From (42),
s2(p1;
1 q2) = s2(p1; p
 
2 ) = B [ C2;
s2(p1;
 q2) = A [ C2:
Since q2 2 P(b2) for all  2 [0; 1], Lemma 8 implies
s2(p1;
0 q2) = s2(p1; q
 
2 ) = A [ C2;
hence, since s is constant on PN(2;  2), s2(p1; q2) = A[C2 for all (p1; q2) 2 P(1)
P(2): The claim now follows from non-bossiness. 
Second Contagion Lemma. Let  2 ePN and let 1 2 eP be adjacent to 1:
(a) If s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() and fA;Bg cuts P(1);
then s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(1;  1):
(b) If s is (2; 1)-consensual or (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA;Bg on PN()
and fA;Bg does not cut P(1); then s is (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA;Bg on
PN(1;  1):
Remark 4. Statement (a) is not the permutation of statement (a) in the First Con-
tagion lemma because the rule is assumed to be (2; 1)-consensual in both cases.
Proof. Fix  2 ePN and 1 2 eP adjacent to 1. For any k 2 N; let p+k ; p k denote
maximal and minimal elements of eJ in P(k); let q+1 ; q 1 be maximal and minimal
elements of eJ in P(1); and let now E;E 0 denote the disjoint subsets of e
 such that
1 and 1 are fE;E 0g-adjacent with 1(E) > 1(E 0). Again, e! =2 E [ E 0:
Step 1. We show that if s is (2; 1)-consensual or (2; 1)-dictatorial on PN(), then
for every k 6= 2 and k0 6= k; s is neither (k; k0)-dictatorial nor (k; k0)-consensual on
PN(1;  1):
Fix k 6= 2; k0 6= k: Fix a prole p 2 PN() such that p1 = p+1 ; p2 = p+2 ,
and pk = p
+
k (where k may coincide with 1). Since s is (2; 1)-consensual or (2; 1)-
dictatorial on PN(); we have e! 2 s2(p): If s is (k; k0)-dictatorial or (k; k0)-consensual
on PN(1;  1), then e! 2 sk(q+1 ; p 1): These two statements contradict the Local
Bilaterality lemma because p+1 ; q
+
1 are fE;E 0g-adjacent and e! =2 E [ E 0:
Step 2. We show that if s is (2; 1)-consensual or (2; 1)-dictatorial on PN(), then s
it is not constant on PN(1;  1):
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Fix a sub-prole p 12 2 PNn12( 12) and drop it from the notation. If s is (2; 1)-
consensual or (2; 1)-dictatorial on PN(), there exist disjoint sets A;B;C2 such thate! 2 A and
s2(p
+
1 ; p
+
2 ) = A [ C2;
s2(p
+
1 ; p
 
2 ) = B [ C2
and the Local Bilaterality lemma implies
s2(q
+
1 ; p
+
2 ) = A [ C2 or (A [ C2 [ E) n E 0;
s2(q
+
1 ; p
 
2 ) = B [ C2 or (B [ C2 [ E) n E 0:
Hence, e! 2 s2(q+1 ; p+2 ) n s2(q+1 ; p 2 ); proving that s is not constant on PN(1;  1).
Step 3. We prove statement (a).
Suppose s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with, say, residuals
C1; :::; Cn; and fA;Bg cuts P(1): Fix p 12 2 PNn12( 12) and drop it from the
notation. By assumption, (42) holds for all (p1; p2) 2 P(1)  P(2) and 1( eA) <
1(B):
Sub-step 3.1. We show that s varies with agent 1's beliefs on PN(1;  1):
Because fA;Bg cuts P(1); there exist adjacent beliefs p1 2 P(1) and q1 2 P(1)
such that p1(A) < p1(B): These beliefs are, in fact, fE;E 0g-adjacent.
Choose p2 2 P(2) such that p2(A) < p2(B): From (42), s2(p+1 ; p2) = B [ C2 and
s2(p1; p2) = A [ C2: By the Local Bilaterality lemma,
s2(q
+
1 ; p2) = B [ C2 or (B [ C2 [ E 0) n E;
s2(q1; p2) = A [ C2 or (A [ C2 [ E 0) n E:
It follows that e! 2 s2(q1; p2) n s2(q+1 ; p2): s varies with agent 1's beliefs.
Sub-step 3.2. By Step 1, Sub-step 3.1, and Lemma 9, s is (2; 1)-consensual on
PN(1;  1) with respect to some fA0; B0g and residuals C 01; :::; C 0n: For all (q1; p 1) 2
PN(1;  1);
s(q1; p 1) =
(
(A0 [ C 01; B0 [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) if q1(A0) > q1(B0) and p2(A0) < p2(B0);
(B0 [ C 01; A0 [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) otherwise,
(54)
where e! 2 A0 and fA0; B0g cuts P(1);P(2). It remains to prove that fA0; B0g =
fA;Bg :
Fix p 12 2 PNn12( 12) and drop it from the notation. If fA0; B0g 6= fA;Bg ;
dene the positive numbers
 = 2(B)  2( eA);
0 = 2(B0)  2( eA0)
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and assume without loss of generality  6= 0:
If  < 0; there exists p2 2 P(2) such that p2(A) > p2(B) and p2(A0) < p2(B0):
From (42), s2(p
+
1 ; p2) = A[C2 and from (54), s2(q+1 ; p2) = B0 [C 02; contradicting the
Local Bilaterality lemma.
If 0 < ; there exists p2 2 P(2) such that p2(A) < p2(B) and p2(A0) > p2(B0):
From (42), s2(p
+
1 ; p2) = B [C2 and from (54), s2(q+1 ; p2) = A0 [C 02; contradicting the
Local Bilaterality lemma again.
Step 4. We prove statement (b).
Sub-step 4.1. Suppose rst that s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN() and fA;Bg does not cut P(1):
By Steps 1, 2, and Lemmas 9 and 10, s is (2; 1)-dictatorial on PN(1;  1) with
respect to some fA0; B0g and residuals C 01; :::; C 0n: For all (q1; p 1) 2 PN(1;  1);
s(q1; p 1) =
(
(A0 [ C 01; B0 [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) if p2(B0) > p2(A0);
(B0 [ C 01; A0 [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) otherwise,
(55)
where e! 2 A0 and fA0; B0g cuts P(1). It remains to prove that fA0; B0g = fA;Bg :
If fA0; B0g 6= fA;Bg ; consider again the numbers ; 0 dened in Sub-step 3.2
and assume without loss of generality  6= 0: Note that 0 may now be negative as
fA0; B0g need no longer cut P(2). This, however, does not aect the rest of the
argument: combining (42) with (55) rather than (54) delivers the same contradiction
to the Local Bilaterality lemma.
Sub-step 4.2. Suppose next that s is (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA;Bg on
PN() and fA;Bg does not cut P(1):
By Steps 1, 2, and Lemma 9, s is either (2; 1)-consensual or (2; 1)-dictatorial on
PN(1;  1):
If s is (2; 1)-consensual on PN(1;  1), it must be with respect to some fA0; B0g 6=
fA;Bg since fA;Bg does not cut P(1):
Suppose rst that fA0; B0g does not cut P(1) : exchanging the roles of fA;Bg ;
fA0; B0g and 1; 1 in the argument in Sub-step 4.1 leads to the conclusion that s is
(2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA0; B0g on PN(); contradicting the assumption of
the current sub-step.
Suppose next that fA0; B0g cuts P(1): exchanging the roles of fA;Bg ; fA0; B0g
and 1; 1 in statement (a) leads to the conclusion that s is (2; 1)-consensual with
respect to fA0; B0g on PN(), again a contradiction.
We conclude that s is (2; 1)-dictatorial on PN(1;  1): The proof that it must
in fact be (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA;Bg proceeds in the same way as in
Sub-step 4.1. 
Independence Lemma. Let  2 ePN ; k 2 N n f1; 2g ; and let k 2 eP be adjacent
to k: If s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(); then s is (2; 1)-
consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(k;  k).
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Proof. Fix  2 ePN and suppose s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN() : there exists a partition fA;B;C1; :::; Cng of 
 such that e! 2 A; fA;Bg cuts
P(1);P(2); and, for all p 2 PN();
s(p) =
(
(A [ C1; B [ C2; C3; :::; Cn) if p1(A) > p1(B) and p2(A) < p2(B);
(B [ C1; A [ C2; C3; :::; Cn) otherwise.
(56)
Fix k 2 N n f1; 2g ; say, k = 3; and let 3 2 eP be adjacent to 3:
By calibrating the probability assigned to e!; we can nd fA;Bg-adjacent beliefs
p1; p
0
1 2 P(1) and fA;Bg-adjacent beliefs p2; p02 2 P(2) with, say, p1(A) > p1(B)
and p2(A) < p2(B). Let p 123 2 PNn123( 123): This sub-prole is xed through-
out the argument and therefore omitted from the notation. Let p+3 ; q
+
3 be maximal
elements of eJ in P(3);P(3).
By (56),
s(p1; p2; p
+
3 ) = (A [ C1; B [ C2; C3; :::; Cn);
s(p01; p2; p
+
3 ) = (B [ C1; A [ C2; C3; :::; Cn);
s(p1; p
0
2; p
+
3 ) = (B [ C1; A [ C2; C3; :::; Cn):
(57)
Step 1. We show that there exists a partition fC 01; :::; C 0ng of 
 n (A [B) such that
s(p1; p2; q
+
3 ) = (A [ C 01; B [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n): (58)
By denition, p+3 ; q
+
3 are adjacent. By the Local Bilaterality lemma and the rst
equality in (57), there are only three cases.
Case 1. There exists some j 6= 1; 2; 3 such that sj(p1; p2; q+3 ) \ s3(p1; p2; p+3 ) 6= ;;
s3(p1; p2; q
+
3 ) \ sj(p1; p2; p+3 ) 6= ;; and si(p1; p2; q+3 ) = si(p1; p2; p+3 ) for all i 6= j; 3:
In this case (58) holds with C 0i = Ci for all i 6= j; 3.
Case 2. s1(p1; p2; q
+
3 ) \ s3(p1; p2; p+3 ) 6= ;; s3(p1; p2; q+3 ) \ s1(p1; p2; p+3 ) 6= ;; and
si(p1; p2; q
+
3 ) = si(p1; p2; p
+
3 ) for all i 6= 1; 3:
If A " s1(p1; p2; q+3 ); then since p1; p01 are fA;Bg-adjacent with p1(A) > p1(B); the
Local Bilaterality lemma implies s(p01; p2; q
+
3 ) = s(p1; p2; q
+
3 ): Comparing with (57),
s1(p
0
1; p2; q
+
3 ) \B = ; and s1(p01; p2; p+3 ) \B 6= ;,
s2(p
0
1; p2; q
+
3 ) \B 6= ; and s2(p01; p2; p+3 ) \B = ;;
s3(p
0
1; p2; q
+
3 ) \ A 6= ; and s3(p01; p2; p+3 ) \ A = ;;
implying si(p
0
1; p2; q
+
3 ) 6= si(p01; p2; p+3 ) for i = 1; 2; 3; contradicting the Local Bilater-
ality lemma.
This shows that A  s1(p1; p2; q+3 ): Then (58) holds with C 0i = Ci for all i 6= 1; 3.
Case 3. s2(p1; p2; q
+
3 ) \ s3(p1; p2; p+3 ) 6= ;; s3(p1; p2; q+3 ) \ s2(p1; p2; p+3 ) 6= ;; and
si(p1; p2; q
+
3 ) = si(p1; p2; p
+
3 ) for all i 6= 2; 3:
47
If B " s2(p1; p2; q+3 ); then since p2; p02 are fA;Bg-adjacent with p2(A) < p2(B); the
Local Bilaterality lemma implies s(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) = s(p1; p2; q
+
3 ): Comparing with (57),
s1(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) \ A 6= ; and s1(p1; p02; p+3 ) \ A = ;;
s2(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) \ A = ; and s2(p1; p02; p+3 ) \ A 6= ;;
s3(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) \B 6= ; and s3(p1; p02; p+3 ) \B = ;;
implying si(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) 6= si(p1; p02; p+3 ) for i = 1; 2; 3; contradicting the Local Bilater-
ality lemma again.
This shows that B  s2(p1; p2; q+3 ); Then (58) holds with C 0i = Ci for all i 6= 2; 3.
Step 2. We show that
s(p01; p2; q
+
3 ) = s(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) = (B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n): (59)
Since p1; p
0
1 are fA;Bg-adjacent, Step 1 and the Local Bilaterality lemma im-
ply that either (i) s(p01; p2; q
+
3 ) = (A [ C 01; B [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) or (ii) s(p01; p2; q+3 ) =
(B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n): Statement (i) and the second statement in (57) to-
gether contradict the Local Bilaterality lemma, hence (ii) must hold. Likewise, the
third statement in (57) and the Local Bilaterality lemma imply that s(p1; p
0
2; q
+
3 ) =
(B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n):
Step 3. Combining statements (58), (59), and statement (b) in Lemma 9, we obtain
that for all (q1; q2; q3) 2 P(1) P(2) P(3);
s(q1; q2; q3) =
(
(A [ C 01; B [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) if q1(A) > q1(B) and q2(A) < q2(B);
(B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) otherwise.
Since p 123 was chosen arbitrarily in PNn123( 123); this proves that s is (2; 1)-
consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(3;  3): 
Next, we derive two corollaries of the above results which link the behavior of s
across sub-domains that need not be adjacent.
First Contagion Corollary. Let  2 ePN ; let 2 2 eP ; and let s be (2; 1)-consensual
with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn:
(a) If fA;Bg cuts P(2); then s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN(2;  2):
(b) If fA;Bg does not cut P(2); then there exists a partition fC 01; :::; C 0ng of 
 n
(A [B) such that s(p) = (B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) for all p 2 PN(2;  2):
Proof. Let  2 ePN ; 2 2 eP ; and suppose s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to
fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn: DeneeP+ = f2 2 eP : 2( eA) < 2(B)g;eP  = f2 2 eP : 2( eA) > 2(B)g:
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These sets partition eP : 2 2 eP+ if and only if fA;Bg cuts P(2). Clearly, eP+ andeP  are connected: any two beliefs in one set are linked by a J-path of adjacent beliefs
in that set. Since s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(), we have
2 2 eP+:
Step 1. We prove statement (a).
Let 2 2 eP+: Let (t2)Tt=1 be a J-path in eP+ with 12 = 2 and T2 = 2: Since
s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(12;  2); repeated application of
statement (a) in the First Contagion lemma implies that s is (2; 1)-consensual with
respect to fA;Bg on PN(T2 ;  2) = PN(2;  2):
Step 2. We prove statement (b).
Call two distinct events C;D  e
 adjacent in 2 2 eP if (2(C)  2(E))(2(D) 
2(E)) > 0 for all E  e
 dierent from C;D: Dene
eP = f2 2 eP : eA;B are adjacent in 2g;eP+ = eP+ \ eP;eP  = eP  \ eP:
We will rst prove that statement (b) holds if 2 2 eP , then show that it holds for
all 2 2 eP : The argument is illustrated in Figure 4.
Sub-step 2.1. If 2 2 eP ; then 2 is f eA;Bg-adjacent to some belief 02 2 eP+: By
statement (a), s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(02;  2): Statement
(b) now follows from statement (b) in the First Contagion lemma.
Sub-step 2.2. If 2 2 eP  n eP , recall rst that, since fA;Bg does not cut P(2), we
have 2( eA) > 2(B): Fix p = (p2; p 2) 2 PN(2;  2). Consider, for each  2 (0; 1) ;
the probability measure 2 dened over the subsets of e
 by
2 (E) = 
2

E \ eA
2
 eA + (1  )
2

E \ eA
2
 eA for all E  e
; (60)
where eA := e
 n eA: Each 2 is a variant of the belief 2 where the probability of the
states in eA relative to those outside eA is modied, but the conditional beliefs on the
subsets of eA; as well as on the subsets of eA; are kept unchanged. If  = 2( eA), then
2 coincides with 2: If  =
2(B)
1+2(B) 2( eA) ; then 2 ( eA) = 2 (B): This means that if 
is suciently close to 2(B)
1+2(B) 2( eA) ; the belief 2 belongs to eP : Elementary algebra
shows that 2( eA) > 2(B)1+2(B) 2( eA) :
Write p2(e!) =  and dene, for each  2 (0; 1) ; the measure p2 over the subsets
of 
 by
p2 (E) =  1(E \ fe!g) + (1  ) 2 E \ e
 for all E  
; (61)
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where 1(E \ fe!g) = 1 if e! 2 E and 0 otherwise.
Choose an increasing sequence of numbers (1); :::; (T ) in (0; 1) such that (i)

(t)
2 is adjacent to 
(t+1)
2 for all t = 1; :::; T   1; (ii) (1)2 2 eP , and (iii) (T )2 = 2:
Dene the J-path (t2)
T
t=1 in eP  by t2 = (t)2 for t = 1; :::; T: Dene the associated
nite sequence (pt2)
T
t=1 in P by pt2 = p(t)2 for t = 1; :::; T: Observe that pT2 = p2 and
pt2 2 P(t2) for each t; but pt2;pt+12 need not be adjacent. Finally, for each t = 1; :::; T;
let yt2 be a maximal element of eJ in P(t2): Observe that yt2;yt+12 are adjacent and
write yT2 = y2:
Since y12 2 P(12) and 12 2 eP ; Sub-step 2.1 implies that there exists a partition
fC 01; :::; C 0ng of 
 n (A [ B) such that s(y12; p 2) = (B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n): We
will show that s(p) = s(p2; p 2) = (B [ C 01; A [ C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n): By non-bossiness, it
suces to prove s2(p) = A [ C 02:
We have
s2(y
1
2; p 2) = A [ C 02:
Proceeding now by induction, x t 2 f1; :::; T   1g and suppose that
s2(y
t
2; p 2) = A [ C 02:
Let fEt; Et+1g 2 H(e
) be the pair of disjoint events such that t2; t+12 are fEt; Et+1g-
adjacent with t2(E
t) > t2(E
t+1): Because t2; 
t+1
2 coincide on eA as well as on eA;
Et \ eA 6= ; and Et+1 \ eA 6= ;:
If s2(y
t+1
2 ; p 2) 6= s2(yt2; p 2); the Local Bilaterality lemma implies s2(yt+12 ; p 2) n
s2(y
t
2; p 2) = E
t+1: Since A  s2(yt2; p 2); we conclude Et+1\ eA = ;, a contradiction.
Therefore s2(y
t+1
2 ; p 2) = A [ C 02; and nally
s2(y2; p 2) = A [ C 02: (62)
Next, we claim that
s2(p) = s2(p2; p 2) = A [ C 02:
First, observe that since p12 2 P(12) and 12 2 eP ; we have
s2(p
1
2; p 2) = A [ C 02
Next, suppose, by way of contradiction, that s2(p2; p 2) = D 6= A [ C 02: By Lemma
9, e! =2 D:
Case 1.
2(C02nD)
2
 eA <
2( eAnD)
2( eA) :
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By strategyproofness, p2(s2(p2; p 2)) > p2(s2(y2; p 2)), hence by (62), pT2 (D) >
pT2 (A [ C 02): Given (61), this means
T2
 eA [ C 02  T2 (D)
1 + T2 (D)  T2
 eA [ C 02 <  : (63)
From (60),
T2 ( eA[C 02) T2 (D)) = (T )
0@2
 eA nD
2
 eA
1A+(1 (T ))
0@2(C 02)  2

D \ eA
2
 eA
1A :
By assumption of Case 1, the second term of this convex combination is smaller than
the rst. Since (1) < (T ), it follows that 12( eA[C 02) 12(D) < T2 ( eA[C 02) T2 (D);
hence from (63),
12
 eA [ C 02  12(D)
1 + 12(D)  12
 eA [ C 02 <  ;
which, given (61), implies p12(D) > p
1
2(A[C 02), that is, p12(s2(q2; p 2)) > p12(s2(p12; p 2));
contradicting strategyproofness.
Case 2.
2(C02nD)
2
 eA 
2( eAnD)
2( eA) :
Dene C 02 := e
 n C 02: Because 2 (C 02) < 2  eA and 2  eA < 2  C 02 ;
2
 eA nD
2
 
C 02
 < 2(C 02 nD)
2 (C 02)
:
Notice that this is the very same inequality as the one dening Case 1 {except that
the roles of C 02 and eA have been exchanged.
For each  2 (0; 1) ; dene the probability measure 2 over the subsets of e
 by
2 (E) = 
2 (E \ C 02)
2 (C 02)
+ (1  )2
 
E \ C 02

2
 
C 02
 for all E  e

and the measure r2 over the subsets of 
 by
r2 (E) =  1(E \ fe!g) + (1  ) 2 E \ e
 for all E  
:
These constructions are the same as in (60) and (61), except that C 02 plays the role
of eA.
Choose an increasing sequence (1); :::; (T ) in (0; 1) such that (i) 
(t)
2 is adjacent
to (t+1)2 for all t; (ii) 
(1)
2 2 eP , and (iii) (T )2 = 2: Dene the path ( t2)Tt=1 in eP  by
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 t2 = 
(t)
2 for all t, and dene the sequence (r
t
2)
T
t=1 in P by rt2 = r(t)2 for all t. Finally,
for each t; let zt2 be a maximal element of eJ in P( t2) and let zT2 = z2:
Since  12 2 eP ; Sub-step 2.1 implies that there exists a partition fC 001 ; :::; C 00ng of

 n (A [B) such that s(z12; p 2) = (B [ C 001 ; A [ C 002 ; C 003 ; :::; C 00n): In particular,
s2(z
1
2; p 2) = A [ C 002 :
By the same inductive argument as in Case 1, we obtain
s2(z2; p 2) = A [ C 002 :
But since both z2 and y2 are maximal elements of eJ in P(2); we have s2(z2; p 2) =
s2(y2; p 2); hence (62) implies
s2(z2; p 2) = A [ C 02:
The proof that s2(p2; p 2) = A[C 02 now follows by the same argument as in Case
1, provided that we exchange the roles of eA and C 02: 
Second Contagion Corollary. Let  2 ePN ; let 1 2 eP; and let s be (2; 1)-
consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn:
(a) If fA;Bg cuts P(1); then s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN(1;  1):
(b) If fA;Bg does not cut P(1); then s is (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA;Bg
on PN(1;  1):
Proof. Let  2 ePN ; 1 2 eP ; and let s be (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN() with residuals C1; :::; Cn: Dene eP+; eP ; eP+; eP  as in the proof of the previous
corollary. By assumption, 1 2 eP+: The argument below is illustrated in Figure 5.
Step 1. To prove statement (a), let 1 2 eP+ and let (t1)Tt=1 be a J-path in eP+
with 11 = 1 and 
T
1 = 1: Since s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on
PN(11;  1); repeated application of statement (a) in the Second Contagion lemma
implies that s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(T1 ;  1) = PN(1;  1).
Step 2. To prove statement (b), we proceed again in two stages.
If 1 2 eP ; there exists a belief 01 2 eP+ to which 1 is f eA;Bg-adjacent. By Step
1, s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(01;  1). By statement (b)
in the Second Contagion lemma, it follows that s is (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to
fA;Bg on PN(1;  1).
If 1 2 eP  n eP ; let (t1)Tt=1 be a J-path in eP  with 11 2 eP  and T1 = 1: Since
s is (2; 1)-dictatorial with respect to fA;Bg on PN(11;  1); repeated application of
statement (b) in the Second Contagion lemma implies that s is (2; 1)-dictatorial with
respect to fA;Bg on PN(T1 ;  1) = PN(1;  1): 
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10.2 Proof of the Bilateral Consensus lemma
We are nally ready to prove the Bilateral Consensus lemma. Let e! 2 
2: This state
is again xed throughout the sub-section, but observe that we now assume that its
assignment varies with the beliefs of at least two agents.
We must show that there exist an event Ee!  
2 such that e! 2 Ee!, and a
bilaterally consensual Ee!-assignment rule se! such that
si(p) \ Ee! = se!i (p j Ee!) for all i 2 N (64)
and all p 2 PN .
Recall the denition of ae! in (2) and the notation ea = ae!:
Step 1. There exist 0 2 ePN ; two distinct agents i; j 2 N; p; q 2 PN(0); and
p0i 2 P(0i ); q0j 2 P(0j ) such that ea(p) 6= ea(p0i; p i) and ea(q) 6= ea(q0j; q j):
By denition of 
2, there exist two agents, say 1; 2; proles p; q 2 PN ; and beliefs
p01; q
0
2 2 P such that
ea(p) 6= ea(p01; p 1) and ea(q) 6= ea(q02; q 2): (65)
Because P is connected, we assume without loss of generality that p1; p01 are adjacent
and p2; p
0
2 are adjacent. Let fE;E 0g be the pair of events such that p1; p01 are fE;E 0g-
adjacent. By the Local Bilaterality lemma and the rst inequality in (65), e! 2 E[E 0;
hence, (p1(C)   p1(D))(p01(C)   p01(D)) > 0 for all distinct C;D  e
. This means
that there exists 01 2 eP such that p1 j e
  p01 j e
  01; that is, p1; p01 2 P(01): By
the same token, there exists 02 2 eP such that p2; p02 2 P(02):
To keep notation simple, suppose n = 3; the argument is easily extended to any
number of agents. Suppose rst that p3 = q3: Dropping that belief from the notation,
(65) reads ea(p1; p2) 6= ea(p01; p2) and ea(q1; q2) 6= ea(q1; q02):
Case 1: ea(p01; q2) 6= ea(p1; q2) 6= ea(p1; q02): In this case the claim is trivially true.
Case 2: (i) ea(p1; q2) = ea(p01; q2) or (ii) ea(p1; q2) = ea(p1; q02):
Assume (i); the argument is the same, up to a relabeling, if (ii) holds. Let (pt2)
T
t=1
be a J-path between p12 = p2 and p
T
2 = q2: From (65) and (i), there exists an integer
t such that ea(p1;pt2) 6= ea(p01;pt2) and ea(p1;pt+12 ) = ea(p01;pt+12 ) (66)
Using the Local Bilaterality lemma, the same argument as in Sub-step 1.1 shows that
there exists 02 such that p
t
2 j e
  pt+12 j e
  02; that is, pt2;pt+12 2 P(02): Moreover,
statement (66) implies
ea(p01;pt2) 6= ea(p1;pt2) 6= ea(p1;pt+12 )
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or ea(p1;pt+12 ) 6= ea(p01;pt+12 ) 6= ea(p01;pt2):
In either case the claim is true.
Finally, let us drop the assumption that p3 = q3: Suppose that there exist p3 6= q3
such that
ea(p1; p2; p3) 6= ea(p01; p2; p3) and ea(q1; q2; q3) 6= ea(q1; q02; q3):
and ea(p1; p2; q3) = ea(p01; p2; q3) and ea(q1; q2; p3) = ea(q1; q02; p3):
Let (pt3)
T
t=1 be a J-path between p
1
3 = p3 and p
T
3 = q3: There exists an integer t such
that ea(p1; p2;pt3) 6= ea(p01; p2;pt3) and ea(p1; p2;pt+13 ) = ea(p01; p2;pt+13 ): (67)
By the Local Bilaterality lemma again, there exists 03 such that p
t
3 j e
  pt+13 j e

 03; that is, pt3;pt+13 2 P(03): Moreover, statement (67) implies
ea(p1; p2;pt3) 6= ea(p01; p2;pt3) 6= ea(p01; p2;pt+13 )
or ea(p1; p2;pt+13 ) 6= ea(p1; p2;pt3) 6= ea(p01; p2;pt3):
In either case the claim is again true.
Step 2. Step 1 has established that there is some 0 2 ePN such that s varies
with the beliefs of two distinct agents, say 1 and 2; on PN(0): By statement (b) in
Lemma 9, s is bilaterally consensual on PN(0) and we may assume without loss of
generality (in light of Remark 2) that s is (2; 1)-consensual on that domain: there
exists a partition fA;B;C1; :::; Cng of 
 such that e! 2 A; fA;Bg cuts P(01); P(02);
and for all p 2 PN(0);
s(p) =
(
(A [ C1; B [ C2; C3; ::::; Cn) if p1(A) > p1(B) and p2(A) < p2(B);
(B [ C1; A [ C2; C3; ::::; Cn) otherwise.
(68)
Dene Ee! := A [ B and dene the bilaterally consensual Ee!-assignment rule se!
as follows: for all ep 2 P(Ee!)N ;
se!(ep) = ( (A;B; ;; :::; ;) if ep1(A) > ep1(B) and ep2(A) < ep2(B);
(B;A; ;; :::; ;) otherwise.
We claim that (64) holds for all p 2 PN :
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By denition, statement (64) is true for all p 2 PN(0): Next, x an arbitrary
sub-prole  12 2 ePNn12:
Sub-step 2.1. By repeated application of the Independence lemma, s is (2; 1)-
consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(01; 02;  12); hence, (64) is true for all
p 2 PN(01; 02;  12):
Sub-step 2.2. For any prole (1; 2) 2 eP+ eP+; combining Sub-step 2.1 with part
(a) of the First Contagion Corollary and part (a) of the Second Contagion Corollary
shows that s is (2; 1)-consensual with respect to fA;Bg on PN(1; 2;  12); hence,
(64) is true for all p 2 PN(1; 2;  12):
Sub-step 2.3. For any prole (1; 2) 2 eP+  eP ; Sub-step 2.2 and part (b) of the
First Contagion Corollary imply that there is a partition fC 01; :::; C 0ng of 
 n (A [B)
such that s(p) = (B[C 01; A[C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) for all p 2 PN(1; 2;  12): Since fA;Bg
does not cut P(2); we have p2(A) > p2(B) for all p2 2 P(2); hence (64) is true for
all p 2 PN(1; 2;  12):
Sub-step 2.4. For any prole (1; 2) 2 eP   eP+; Sub-step 2.2 and part (b) of
the Second Contagion Corollary imply that s is (2; 1)-dictatorial on PN(1; 2;  12):
Since fA;Bg does not cut P(1); we have p1(A) > p1(B) for all p1 2 P(1), hence
(64) is true for all p 2 PN(1; 2;  12):
Sub-step 2.5. Consider nally a prole (1; 2) 2 eP   eP : By denition, 2( eA) >
2(B): For each  2 (0; 1) ; consider again the measure 2 dened on e
 by (60).
Recall that 2 coincides with 2 for  = 2( eA) and observe that 2 2 eP+ for any
generic  < 2(B)
1+2(B) 2( eA) :
Choose an increasing sequence of numbers (1); :::; (T ) such that (i) (t)2 is
adjacent to (t+1)2 for all t = 1; :::; T   1; (ii) (1)2 2 eP+, and (iii) (T )2 = 2:
Consider the J-path (t2)
T
t=1 in eP  dened by t2 =(t) 2 for t = 1; :::; T:
Since 12 2 eP+; Sub-step 2.3 implies that there exists a partition fC 01; :::; C 0ng of

 n (A[B) such that s(p) = (B [C 01; A [C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) for all p 2 PN(1; 12;  12):
The same argument as in Sub-step 2.2 of the proof of the First Contagion Corollary
then establishes that s(p) = (B[C 01; A[C 02; C 03; :::; C 0n) for all p 2 PN(1; T2 ;  12) =
PN(1; 2;  12).
Since fA;Bg does not cut P(2); we have p2(A) > p2(B) for all p2 2 P(2); hence
(64) is true for all p 2 PN(1; 2;  12):
Since P = [i2 ePP(i), the proof of the Bilateral Consensus lemma is complete.

11 Appendix D: proof of the Bilateral Dictator-
ship lemma
Let 
11 be the set of states whose assignment varies only with the beliefs of agent 1,
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namely,
! 2 
11 ,

there exist p 2 PN and p01 2 P such that a!(p) 6= a!(p01; p 1)

and
a!(:; p j) is constant on P for all j 6= 1 and p j 2 PNnj

:
To avoid triviality, assume 
11 6= ;: Let e! 2 
11. We must show that there exist a
set N1  N n 1; a partition


j11
	
j2N1 of 
11; and for each j 2 N1 a (1; j)-dictatorial

j11-assignment rule s
j such that
si(p) \ 
11 = [j2N1sji (p j 
j11) (69)
for all p 2 PN and i 2 N:
Dene the family
A11 =

A  
11 : 9p 2 PN such that s1(p) \ 
11 = A
	
=

A  
11 : 9p1 2 P such that s1(p1; p 1) \ 
11 = A for all p 1 2 PNn1
	
;
where the rst equality constitutes the denition and the second follows from the
denition of 
11:
Let 
11 = 
 n 
11: Call a belief p1 2 P 
11-dominant if jp1(A)  p1(B)j >
jp1(A0)  p1(B0)j for all distinct A;B  
11 and all distinct A0; B0  
11 (or, equiv-
alently, jp1(!)  p1(!0)j > p1(
11) for all distinct !; !0 2 
11). In such a belief,
the probability dierences within 
11 overwhelm the dierences outside 
11. To see
that such beliefs exist, write 
11 = f1; :::;mg and observe that any belief p1 such
that p1(1) > p1(
 n 1), p1(2) > p1(
 n 12), ..., and p1(m) > p1(
 n 1:::m   1); is

11-dominant. Let P11 denote the set of 
11-dominant beliefs.
Step 1. We show that
s1(p) \ 
11 = argmax
A11
p1 (70)
for all p = (p1; p 1) 2 P11 PNn1:
The claim is obviously true if 
11 = 
; in what follows we assume 
11 6= 
: For
any two beliefs p1; q1 2 P and for any p 1 2 PNn1; we claim that
p1 j 
11 = q1 j 
11
) s1(p1; p 1) \ 
11 = s1(q1; p 1) \ 
11 . (71)
To see why this is true, x p1; q1 2 P ; p 1 2 PNn1; and note that the denitions of

0 and 
1j for j 6= 1 trivially imply
s1(p1; p 1) \ [
0 [ [j 6=1
1j] = s1(q1; p 1) \ [
0 [ [j 6=1
1j] :
Moreover, by the Bilateral Consensus corollary, agent 1's share of 
2 is determined
by bilateral consensus, hence does not depend on her belief outside 
2: Therefore,
p1 j 
11 = q1 j 
11
) [s1(p1; p 1) \ 
2 = s1(q1; p 1) \ 
2] ,
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and (71) follows.
Let now p = (p1; p 1) 2 P11  PNn1: Since p 1 is xed in the argument below,
we drop it from the list of arguments of s1. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that
s1(p1) \ 
11 6= argmax
A11
p1: Choosing q1 2 P such that s1(q1) \ 
1 = argmax
A11
p1; we
have
p1(s1(q1) \ 
11) > p1(s1(p1) \ 
11):
Because p1 is 
11-dominant,
p1(s1(q1) \ 
11)  p1(s1(p1) \ 
11)
> p1(s1(p1) \ 
11)  p1(s1(q1) \ 
11):
Combining these inequalities yields p1(s1(q1)) > p1(s1(p1)); contradicting strategyproofness.
Step 2. We prove that (70) holds for all p 2 PN :
Let p = (p1; p 1) 2 PN and drop again p 1 from the list of arguments of s1: For
each  2 (0; 1) ; dene the probability measure p1 over the subsets of 
 by
p1(A) = 
p1(A \ 
11)
p1(
11)
+ (1  )p1(A \ 
11)
p1(
11)
for all A  
: (72)
If  = p1(
11), then p1 coincides with p1: If  is suciently close to 1, then p1 is

11-dominant. For every ; p1 j 
11 = p1 j 
11 and p1 j 
11 = p1 j 
11:
Choose an increasing sequence of numbers (1); :::; (T ) such that (i) (t)p1 is
adjacent to (t+1)p1 for all t = 1; :::; T   1; (ii) (1)p1 = p1, and (iii) (T )p1 is 
11-
dominant. Consider the J-path (pt1)
T
t=1 in P dened by pt1 =(t) p1 for t = 1; :::; T:
Let At = s1(p
t
1) \ 
11 for t = 1; :::; T: Suppose, contrary to the claim, that A1 6=
argmax
A11
p1: Since p
T
1 is 
11-dominant and p
T
1 j 
11 = p1 j 
11; Step 1 implies AT =
argmax
A11
p1: Let t be the largest integer in f1; :::; T   1g such that At 6= argmax
A11
p1: Let
fEt; Et+1g be the pair of disjoint events such that pt1;pt+11 are fEt; Et+1g-adjacent
and pt1(E
t) > pt1(E
t+1): Because pt1 j 
11 = pt+11 j 
11 and pt1 j 
11 = pt+11 j 
11;
Et \ 
11 6= ; and Et+1 \ 
11 6= ;:
By the Local Bilaterality lemma,
s1(p
t
1) n s1(pt+11 ) = Et and s1(pt+11 ) n s1(pt1) = Et+1:
It follows that (s1(p
t
1) n s1(pt+11 ))\
11 6= ;; that is, s1(pt1)\
11 6= s1(pt+11 )\
11,
contradicting (71).
Step 3. We show that for all p; q 2 P11  PNn1;
[p1 j 
11 = q1 j 
11]) [si(p) \ 
11 = si(q) \ 
11 for all i 2 N ] :
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Let p; q 2 P11  PNn1: Since we are only concerned with the restriction of s to

11, we may assume p 1 = q 1 and omit that sub-prole from the notation. Suppose
p1 j 
11 = q1 j 
11: By Step 1,
s1(p1) \ 
11 = s1(q1) \ 
11 = argmax
A11
p1: (73)
Because p1; q1 2 P11; (73) and super-strategyproofness imply
si(p1) \ 
11 = si(q1) \ 
11 for all i 2 N:
Indeed, if, say, s2(p1)\
11 6= s2(q1)\
11; then (73) and the assumption p1 j 
11 = q1 j

11 imply that either (i) p1(s12(p1)\
11) > p1(s12(q1)\
11) and q1(s12(p1)\
11) >
q1(s12(p1) \ 
11); or (ii) both of these two strict inequalities are reversed. Because
p1;q1 are 
11-dominant, each of (i) and (ii) violates super-strategyproofness.
Step 4. We claim that for every ! 2 
11 there is a unique j 6= 1 such that a!(P11 
PNn1) = f1; jg .
From Step 3, the assignment of all states in 
11 depends only on the conditional
beliefs of agent 1 over 
11. We may thus drop p 1 from the notation and regard s
as a function from P(
11) to S(
11): By assumption, s is super-strategyproof (hence
also non-bossy) and it is not constant on P(
11).
We want to show that
sj(p1) \ sk(q1) = ; for any distinct j; k 2 N n 1 (74)
and any p1; q1 2 P(
11): For any ~
11  
11, an ~
11-assignment rule ~s : P(~
11) !
S(~
11) will be called 1-C-BD union if it is a union of constant or bilaterally 1-
dictatorial rules on ~
11; namely, if there is a partition


l11
	L
t=1
of 
11 such that, for
all p1 2 P(~
11),
~si(p1) = [Ll=1sli(p1 j 
l11) for all i 2 N; (75)
where each sl is a constant or (1; jl)-dictatorial 
l11-assignment rule. With a slight
abuse of terminology, we will call (the restriction to P of) ~s a 1-C-BD union over P
if (75) is satised for all p1  P  P(~
11). We prove Step 4 by induction on the size
of 
11.
Sub-step 4.1. Suppose that j
11j = 2 and consider a super-strategyproof assignment
rule ~s : P(
11)! S(
11). Then there exists j 2 N n 1 such that ~s1j(p) = 
11 for all
p1 2 P(
11). It follows that ~s is a 1-C-BD union.
Indeed, suppose that 
11 = f!1; !2g and let ~p1 2 P(
11). If we have either ~s1( ~p1) = ;
or ~s1( ~p1) = 
11, then ~s is constant over P(
11) and the result of Sub-step 4.1 trivially
holds. Without loss of generality, suppose now that ~s1( ~p1) = f!1g. Then there
exists some agent j 6= 1 such that !2 2 sj( ~p1) and obviously ~s1j( ~p1) = 
11. By
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super-strategyproofness of ~s; we have p1(~s1j(p1))  p1(~s1j( ~p1)) = p1(
11) = 1, hence,
p1(~s1j( ~p1)) = 1; for all p 2 P(
11); meaning that ~s is (1; j)-dictatorial. Thus, in all
possible cases, ~s is a 1-C-BD union.
Suppose now that j
11j = K  3 and assume by induction that every assignment
rule ~s : P(~
11)! S(~
11) such that j~
11j  K   1 is a 1-C-BD union.
Recalling that the range of s1() is E  fE  
11 : s1(p1) = E for some p1 2
P(
11)g; strategyproofness of s obviously implies s1(p1) = argmax
E
p1 for all p1 2
P(
11).
Given any ! 2 
11, dene the set of !-lexicographic beliefs L(!) := fp1 2
P(
11) : p1(!1) > p1(
11 n !)g. For any q1 2 P(
11) [ P(
11 n !); let Lq1(!) :=
fp1 2 L(!) : p1 j (
11 n !) = p1 j (
11 n !)g and, for any  2 (12 ; 1), dene q!;1 2
Lq1(!) as follows: for all !0 2 
11,
q!;1 (!
0) :=
(
 if !0 = !;
q1(!0)
1  if !
0 6= !:
Sub-step 4.2. Consider q1 2 
11 such that ! 2 s1(q1); and suppose that p1 2 Lq1(!).
Then we have s(p1) = s(q1).
The proof of Sub-step 4.2. is rather straightforward, and left to the reader. It follows
from non-bossiness of s and the fact that p1(!) > 1=2 for all p1 2 Lq1(!).
Sub-step 4.3. Fix ! 2 
11 and  2 (12 ; 1). Dene the mapping ~s ! : P(
11n !)!
S(
11 n !) as follows: (i) ~s !1 (q1) = s1(q!;1 ) n !; (ii) ~s !i (q1) = si(q!;1 ); 8i 6= 1.
Then ~s
 ! is an (
11 n !)-assignment rule and a 1-C-BD union.
To prove Sub-step 4.3, note rst that ! 2 s1(p1) for all p1 2 L(!). Indeed, since
the range E of s1() is a proper covering of 
11, there exists p1 2 P(~
11) such that
! 2 s1(p1): Therefore, if ! =2 s1(p1) for some p1 2 L(!), we would have p1(s1(p1)) 
p1(!) >
1
2
> p1(s1(p1)), contradicting strategyproofness.
Building on this result, observe from (i)-(ii) above that the mapping ~s
 ! satises
the feasibility constraint. Indeed, for any q1 2 P(
11 n !)1, since q!;1 2 L(!), we get
from the feasibility of s that
[i2N ~s !i (q1) =
= ~s
 !
1 (q1)z }| {
(s1(q
!;
1 )| {z }
!2
n!)[[[i2Nni si(q!;1 )| {z }
!=2
] = 
11 n !:
Thus, the mapping ~s
 ! is a well-dened (
11 n !)-assignment rule. Moreover, it is
super-strategyproof (because s is), and since j
11 n !j = K   1 < K, our induction
hypothesis implies that ~s
 ! is a 1-C-BD union.
Sub-step 4.4. Fix ! 2 
11. The mapping s! : L(!) ! S(
11 n !), dened as the
restriction of s to L(!), is a 1-C-BD union over L(!). As a consequence, (74) must
hold for all p1; q1 2 L(!).
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This follows from the combination of Sub-step 4.2 and Sub-step 4.3. Indeed, x any
 > 1=2; and note from Sub-step 4.2 that, for all q1 2 L(!), we have s!(q1) = s(q1) =
s(q!;1 ) because q
!;
1 2 Lq1(!). That is to say,
s!1 (q1) = ! [ ~s !1 (q1 j (
11 n !)) and s!i (q1) = ~s !i (q1 j (
11 n !)); 8i 6= 1: (76)
Recalling from Sub-step 4.3 that ~s is a 1-C-BD union, there exists a partition
f
111; : : : ;
L11g of 
11 n ! and L 
l-assignment rules s1; : : : ; sL such that ~s !i (q1 j
(
11 n !)) = [Ll=1sli(q1 j 
l11) and each sl is constant or (1; jl)-dictatorial for some
jl 6= 1. Substituting this in (76) thus gives: for all q1 2 L(!) and i 2 N ,
s!i (q1) =
 [Ll=1sli(q1 j 
l11) if i 6= 1;
! [  [Ll=1sli(q1 j 
l11) if i = 1: (77)
Observe from (77) that s!, the restriction of s to L(!) is expressed as the union of
the L + 1 sub-rules s0; s1; : : : ; sL, where s0 is the constant 
0-assignment rule which
always assigns 
011 := f!g to agent 1. This concludes the proof of Sub-step 4.4.
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Step 4. Since P(
11) is connected,
there is a J-path (pt1)
T
t=1 in P(
11) between any two beliefs p1; q1 2 P(
11): If the
length T 1 of this path is equal to 1; then p1; q1 are adjacent and the Local Bilaterality
lemma implies sj(p1) \ sk(q1) = ; for any distinct j; k 2 N n 1: Next, proceeding by
induction, we assume that (74) is true whenever p1; q1 are connected by some J-path
of length T 0  1 < T   1 (with T  3) and we prove that (74) also holds for any p1; q1
that are connected by some J-path of length T   1.
By contradiction, suppose that there exist ! 2 
11 and p001; p0001 2 P(
11) such
that, say, ! 2 s2(p001)\s3(p0001 ) and p001; p0001 are connected by some J-path q1 = (qt1)Tt=1.
Combining the Local bilaterality lemma with our induction hypothesis that (74) holds
for all p1; q1 that are connected by some J-path of length T
0  T   1, we obtain
w 2 s1(qT 11 ) n s1(qT1 ) =s3(qT1 ) n s3(qT 11 ) 6= ; (78)
si(q
T 1
1 ) =si(q
T
1 ); 8i 6= 1; 3 (79)
s3(q
T 1
1 )\si(p001) = ;; 8i 6= 1; 3: (80)
To see why (78) holds, note that w 2 s1(qt 11 ) n s1(qt1) for some t  T   1 would
imply a violation of our induction hypothesis on the J-path fq11; : : : ;qt1g, which is of
length t  1 < T   1. Statement (80) holds for the same reason. Finally, (79) follows
from (78) and the Local Bilaterality lemma. In addition, observe that combining (79)
and (80) gives
si(p
000
1 ) \ s3(p001) = si(qT1 ) \ s3(p001) = si(qT 11 ) \ s3(p001) = ;; 8i 6= 1; 3: (81)
Sub-step 4.5. There exist !3 2 s1(p0001 ) \ s3(p001) and !2 2 s1(p001) \ s3(p0001 ).
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To prove Sub-step 4.5, rst note that, together, ! 2 s2(p001) \ s3(p0001 ) and the super-
strategyproofness of s imply that p0001 (sNn3(p
000
1 )) > p
000
1 (sNn3(p
00
1)). Thus, there exists
!^ 2 
11 such that
!^ 2 sNn3(p0001 ) n sNn3(p001) = sNn3(p0001 ) \ s3(p001): (82)
It thus suces now to remark that sNn3(p0001 )\ s3(p001) = s1(p0001 )\ s3(p001). Indeed, given
that we have sNn3(p0001 ) := [i 6=3si(p0001 ), we can write
sNn3(p0001 ) \ s3(p001) = [s1(p0001 ) \ s3(p001)] [ [[i6=1;3 (si(p0001 ) \ s3(p001))| {z }
=; by (81)
] = s1(p
000
1 ) \ s3(p0001 ):
Thus, !^ 2 sNn3(p0001 )\ sNn3(p001) = s1(p0001 )\ s3(p0001 ). A symmetric argument shows that
there exists !2 2 s1(p001) \ s3(p0001 ); and this ends the proof of Sub-step 4.4.
Recall from what precedes that ! 2 s2(p001) \ s3(p0001 ), !3 2 s1(p0001 ) \ s3(p001) and
!2 2 s1(p001) \ s3(p0001 ). The states !; !2; !3 are thus necessarily (pairwise) distinct.
We show a few additional sub-steps below.
Fix any q001 2 Lp001 (!2) (see Figure 6) and q0001 2 Lp0001 (!3); and dene tq0001 2 L(!3) by
tq0001 (!3) = q
000
1 (!2),
tq0001 (!2) = q
000
1 (!3) and
tq0001 (!) = q
000
1 (!); 8! 6= !2; !3. In addition,
call !2!3 the probability measure over 
11 dened by:
10
!2!3 (!2) = 
!2
!3
(!2) = 1=2; and 
!2
!3
(!) = 0 for all ! 6= !2; !3:
Dene the two sequences fqm1 gm mq and fqm1 gm mq as follows: for any ! 2 
11,
qm1 (!) =
1
m
q0001 + (1 
1
m
)!2!3 ; (83)
qm1 (!) =
1
m
tq0001 + (1 
1
m
)!2!3 :
Figure 6 gives an illustration of the construction of the beliefs qm1 ; q
m starting from
p001 2 L(!2). It is important to remark that, by denition, we have qm1 2 L(!2) and
qm1 2 L(!3).11
Sub-step 4.6. There exist ~m 2 IN (with ~m  mq; mq) and A; A 2 S(
11) such
that
[m  ~m]) [s(qm1 ) = A and s(qm1 ) = A]:
The proof of Sub-step 4.6 is similar to that of Lemma 3-(i), and therefore left to the
reader.
10Obviously, !2!3 is not an injective probability measure (i.e., 
!2
!3 =2 P(
11)); but this does not
aect the validity of our upcoming argument |which is based on the study of sequences of injective
probability measures that converge to !2!3 .
11There may exist only a nite number of integers m such that qm1 ; q
m
1 are not injective; and this
issue is taken care of by conveniently starting the sequence at a rank mq (or mq) that is higher than
any such integer.
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Sub-step 4.7. For any m  ~m, we have ! 2 s2(qm1 ); and it follows that A 6= A.
We showed in Sub-step 4.4 that s!2 , the restriction of s to L(!2), can be written as
s !2i (q1) =
 [Ll=1sli(q1 j 
l11) if i 6= 1;
!2 [
 [Ll=1sli(q1 j 
l11) if i = 1; (84)
where each sl is constant or (1; jl)-dictatorial for some jl 6= 1. Call 
w11 the unique
event in the partition f 
011|{z}
=f!2g
;
111; : : : ;

L
11g of 
11 such that ! 2 
w11 . Since q001 2
Lp001 (!2)  L(!2), it follows from Sub-step 4.2 that ! 2 s2(p001) = s2(q001) = s!22 (q001);
and we may then conclude from (84) that j!

= 2 and s!

is (1,2)-dictatorial over

!

11 . We get in the same way that j
!3 = 3 and s!3 is (1,3)-dictatorial over 
!311 . It thus
follows that !3; !2 =2 
!11 {obviously, !2 =2 
!11 since 
011 = f!2g. Using (84) and the
fact that s!

is (1,2)-dictatorial, we may assert that ! 2 s2(q1) for any q1 2 L(!2)
such that q1 j 
!11 = q001 j 
!11 . One can then see that ! 2 s2(qm1 ) by combining
(83) and !2; !3 =2 
!11 to deduce that we indeed have: qm1 j 
!11 = q001 j 
!11 , for all
m  mq.
We conclude the proof of Sub-step 4.7 by noting that we necessarily have A 6= A.
Indeed, since ~m  mq, we have ! 2 A2 = s2(q ~m1 ). Assuming that A = A would
thus give ! 2 A2 = A2 = s2(q ~m). But this would contradict the fact that s!3 is a
1-C-BD union over L(!3) (established in Sub-step 4.4), which requires (74) to hold
for q ~m; q0001 2 L(!3) |recall that ! 2 s3(q0001 ).
Sub-step 4.8. There exist disjoint subsets E; E  
 n f!2; !3; !g such that
A1 n A1 = !2 [ E = A3 nA3;
A1 nA1 = !3 [ E = A3 n A3;
Ai = Ai for all i 6= 1; 3:
We start the proof of Sub-step 4.8 by noting that: 9m^  ~m such that, for any fF; Fg 2
H and any m  m^, w2 =2 F or !3 =2 F ) (qm1 (F )  qm1 ( F ))(qm1 (F )  qm1 ( F )) > 0 :
This implication holds by construction since lim
m!1
qm1 = lim
m!1
qm1 = 
!2
!3
and !2!3 (!2) =
!2!3 (!3) = 1=2. In words: when m is large enough, the segment [q
m
1 ; q
m
1 ] cuts only
hyperplanes fF; Fg 2 H such that !2 2 F and !3 2 F (see Figure 7), and qm1 ; qm1 are
on the same side of all other hyperplanes.
Second, recall from (83) that qm1 j (
11 n f!2; !3g) = qm1 j (
11 n f!2; !3g) = q001 j
(
11 n f!2; !3g), for any m  m^. It hence follows that the set of hyperplanes of the
form f!2 [ E; !3 [ Eg is totally ordered along the segment [qm^1 ; qm^1 ]. Calling T the
number of such hyperplanes, we may thus write
ffF; Fg 2 H j F = !2[E; F = !3[ Eg = ff!2[E1; !3[ E1g; : : : ; f!2[ET ; !3[ ET ; gg;
where Et [t = 1; : : : ; T ] is the tth hyperplane cut on the way from qm^1 to q
m^
1 . Using
this notation, we may then consider a J-path fpt1gT+1t=1 satisfying the properties: (i)
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p11 = q
m^
1 , p
T+1
1 = q
m^
1 ; (ii) p
t
1 and p
t+1
1 are f!2 [ Et; !3 [ Etg-adjacent for any t =
1; : : : ; T .
We conclude the proof of Sub-step 4.8 by showing that there exists a unique
t 2 f1; Tg such that: (a) s(pt1) = s(qm^1 );8t 2 f1; : : : ; tg and (b) s(pt1) = s(qm^1 );8t 2
ft + 1; : : : ; T + 1g. First, note that the assignment may change only once along
the J-path p: Indeed, if s(pt

1 ) 6= s(pt
+1
1 ) then we get from the Local Bilaterality
lemma that s1(p
t
1 ) n s1(pt
+1
1 ) = !2 [Et ; and (given that !2 =2 s1(pt
+1
1 )), the Local
Bilaterality lemma requires that s(pt1) = s(q
m^
1 );8t 2 ft + 1; : : : ; T + 1g.
Second, recall from Sub-step 4.7 (and m^  ~m) that s(qm^1 ) = A 6= A = s(qm^1 ).
Hence, there must indeed exist a unique t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg such that s(pt1 ) 6= s(pt
+1
1 ).
The Local Bilaterality lemma, applied to the adjacent beliefs pt

1 ;p
t+1
1 , then gives
the desired result: A1 n A1 = !2 [ Et = A3 nA3; A1 nA1 = !3 [ Et = A3 n A3;
Ai = Ai;8i 6= 1; 3. Recalling from Sub-step 4.7 that ! 2 s2(qm^1 ) = A2, we obtain
that Et ; Et  
 n f!2; !3; !g.
We are nally ready to clinch the proof of Step 4. We have shown in Sub-step
4.8 that ! 2 s2(qm^1 ) = A2 = A2 = s2(
2L(!3)z}|{
qm^1 ). But this is a contradiction given that
! 2 s3(
2L(!3)z}|{
q0001 ). Indeed, this violation of (74) contradicts the fact that (the restriction
to L(!3) of) s is a 1-C-BD union over L(!3) |which was established in Sub-step
4.4. Thus, it never holds that ! 2 sj(p001) \ sk(p0001 ) for any !, p001; p0001 and distinct
j; k 6= 1. Given that s is not constant on P(
11), for any ! 2 
11, we thus have,
a!(P(
11)) = f1; jg for some j 6= 1.
Step 5. We show that for every ! 2 
11 there is a unique j 6= 1 such that a!(PN) =
f1; jg :
Let ! 2 
11: By Step 4, there is a unique j 6= 1 such that a!(P11PNn1) = f1; jg :
We claim that a!(PN) = f1; jg : Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists some
k 6= 1; j and some p 2 PN such that ! 2 sk(p): Drop p 1 from the notation. Consider
an 
11-dominant belief p

1 2 P11 such that p1 j 
11 = p1 j 
11 and p1 j 
11 = p1 j 
11:
Such a belief can be constructed by taking  close to 1 in (72). Since a!(P11 
PNn1) = f1; jg, we have ! =2 sk(p1): By Step 2, s1(p1) \ 
11 = s1(p1) \ 
11: By (71),
s1(p1) = s1(p

1). By non-bossiness, s(p1) = s(p

1); contradicting ! 2 sk(p1) n sk(p1)
and completing Step 5.
For every j 6= 1; dene 
j11 =

! 2 
11 : a!(PN) = f1; jg
	
: Let N1 = fj 2 N n1 :

j11 6= ;g: By denition,


j11 : j 2 N1
	
is a partition of 
11: For each j 2 N1; let
Aj11 =

Aj  
j11 : 9p 2 PN such that s1(p) \ 
j11 = Aj
	
:
Step 6. We show that A11 is a product family. Namely, for any collection of events
fAj : j 2 N1g ; 
Aj 2 Aj11 for all j 2 N1
) [j2N1Aj 2 A11 :
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Suppose Aj 2 Aj11 for all j 2 N1 and write N1 = f2; :::; n1g : Call a belief p1
lexicographically (
211; :::;

n1
11)-dominant if jp1(A)  p1(B)j > jp1(A0)  p1(B0)j for all
distinct A;B  
j11; all A0; B0  
 n ([jk=1
k11); and all j = 2; :::; n   1: Consider a
lexicographically (
211; :::;

n1
11)-dominant belief p1 such that
argmax
Aj11
p1 = A
j
for all j = 2; :::; n  1: Fix p 1 2 PNn1 and drop it from the notation.
Strategyproofness implies
s1(p1) \ 
211 = A2:
This is because there is some q1 such that s1(q1)\
211 = A2; argmax
A211
p1 = A
2; and p1
is 
211-dominant.
Next, proceed inductively. Suppose we have shown that s1(p1) \ 
j11 = Aj for
j = 2; :::; k   1: We claim that
s1(p1) \ 
k11 = Ak: (85)
Since Ak 2 Ak11; there is some q1 such that s1(q1)\
k11 = Ak: If s1(p1)\
k11 = Bk 6= Ak;
then
p1(sf1;:::;k 1g(p1) \ ([kj=2
j11)) = p1([k 1j=2
j11 [Bk)
< p1([k 1j=2
j11 [ Ak)
= p1(sf1;:::;k 1g(q1) \ ([kj=2
j11));
contradicting super-strategyproofness and proving (85).
We conclude that s1(p1)\
j11 = Aj for all j 2 N1, which implies that s1(p1)\
11 =
[j2N1Aj; hence [j2N1Aj 2 A11:
Step 7. Step 6 ensures that argmax
A11
p1 = [j2N1 argmax
Aj11
p1 for all p1 2 P . Combining
this with Step 2,
s1(p) \ 
11 = [j2N1 argmax
Aj11
p1
for all p 2 PN : Dening for each j 2 N1 the (1; j)-dictatorial 
j11-assignment rule sj
by
sji (ep) =
8>>>><>>>>:
argmax
Aj11
ep1 if i = 1;

j11 n argmax
Aj11
ep1 if i = j;
; if i 6= 1; j
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for all ep 2 P(
j11)N ; statement (69) holds for p 2 PN and i 2 N:
To complete the proof, it only remains to check that Aj11 is a proper covering of

j11 for every j 2 N1:
Fix j 2 N1. To check that [Aj2Aj11A
j = 
j11; x ! 2 
j11: Since, by denition
of 
j11; a!(PN) = f1; jg ; there is some p 2 PN such that ! 2 s1(p); hence some
Aj 2 Aj11 such that ! 2 Aj:
To check that Aj n Bj 6= ; for all distinct Aj; Bj 2 Aj11; suppose on the contrary
that Aj  Bj: By Step 6, this implies that there exist A;B 2 A11 such that A  B:
But by denition of A11 and Step 1, there is some p such that A = argmax
A11
p1;
contradicting the fact that p1(A) < p1(B):
To check that \Aj2Aj11A
j = ;; suppose on the contrary that ! 2 \Aj2Aj11A
j. Then
! 2 s1(p) for all p 2 PN ; contradicting the fact that a!(PN) = f1; jg : 
12 Appendix E: Figures
Figure 1: Beliefs, likelihood orderings, and adjacency
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Figure 2: The binary relation eJ
Figure 3: Illustration of the proof of the rst contagion lemma
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Figure 4: Illustration of the proof of the rst contagion corollary
Figure 5: Illustration of the proof of the second contagion corollary
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Figure 6: Construction of qm1 and q
m
1 .
For m large, [qm1 ; q
m
1 ] cuts only hyperplanes of the form f!2 [ E; !3 [ Eg.
Note in this example that [q001 ; q
000
1 ] | but not [q
m
1 ; q
m
1 ]{ cuts f!3; !g 2 H.
Figure 7: Hyperplanes cut by [qm1 ; q
m
1 ].
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